Common Crowd Dynamics: Shaping Behavioral Intention Models by Bouchard, Marcel
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
OpenSIUC
Theses Theses and Dissertations
12-1-2011
Common Crowd Dynamics: Shaping Behavioral
Intention Models
Marcel Bouchard
Southern Illinois University Carbondale, mbo9472@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/theses
This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bouchard, Marcel, "Common Crowd Dynamics: Shaping Behavioral Intention Models" (2011). Theses. Paper 723.
COMMON CROWD DYNAMICS: SHAPING BEHAVIORAL INTENTION MODELS
by
Marcel Bouchard
B.S., University of Georgia, 2009
A Thesis
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Master of Science Degree
Department of Computer Science
in the Graduate School
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
December 2011
THESIS APPROVAL
COMMON CROWD DYNAMICS: SHAPING BEHAVIORAL INTENTION MODELS
By
Marcel Bouchard
A Thesis Submitted in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Science
in the field of Computer Science
Approved by:
Dr. Henry Hexmoor, Chair
Dr. Namdar Mogharreban
Dr. Mengxia Zhu
Graduate School
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
July 14, 2011
AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF
Marcel Bouchard, for the Master of Science degree in Computer Science, presented on July 14, 
2011, at Southern Illinois University Carbondale.
TITLE:  COMMON CROWD DYNAMICS: SHAPING BEHAVIORAL INTENTION
MODELS
MAJOR PROFESSOR:  Dr. Henry Hexmoor
As the human population grows, so too does the need to understand human behavior. 
One particularly important aspect of human behavior is how it changes within conglomerations 
of people, i.e. crowds.  In this thesis, a method for modeling crowd behavior is proposed.  This 
method draws inspiration from the concept of behavioral intention and the related forces of 
attitudes, influences, and social norms.  These topics are first defined and detailed, followed by a 
survey of related research.  Next, the model is presented and adapted to three common crowd 
dynamics, each stressing a different component of behavioral intention.  Observations are made 
about these models, and extensions to the models and directions for future research are 
considered.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The capacity to predict and better understand human behavior is a powerful tool for 
improving nearly any computational endeavor that involves human interaction: architecture 
design, evacuation planning, crowd control, disaster response, anti-drug campaigns, etc.  The 
opportunity for such study has never been better.  As the human population has grown in number 
and spread across the planet, so too has the opportunity for humanity to demonstrate special 
forms of behavior observed when masses of people gather together and form crowds.  Crowd 
studies have been further augmented by the maturation of the social and psychological sciences 
and by the development of computer technology powerful enough for modeling and simulation.
Alongside contributing factors such as industrialization and the rise of cities, Reicher 
(2001) marks the French Third Republic as the “birthplace of crowd psychology”.  Reicher 
supports this claim with an example of the debate between Scipio Sighele and Gabriel Tarde in 
the 1890s.  This debate concerned how to determine criminal responsibility in the crowd, 
struggling to distinguish between individual and crowd forces.  It is a problem that merits 
investigation to this day.  The 1890s also saw Gustave le Bon (1895) develop his theories of the 
crowd mind, observing that concentrated masses of people are more than just the sum of their 
component individuals; other forces must be at work.  The rising prevalence of crowds and 
opportunities to observe them have continued to spawn new lines of research and debate 
throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.
Related to and often part of crowd research is the study and modeling of individual 
behavior.  The term “individual” does not imply that such models isolate a person from others. 
Rather, individual behavior models incorporate endogenous attitudes originating from within the 
2person and account for the outside effects of physical and social influences.  Which forces are 
most important, their effects, and how they interact with each other is a target of extensive study, 
and many different models have been proposed.  Among these models are Ajzen and Fishbein's 
theory of reasoned action (1981) and other models descended from and inspired by it.  The 
variety of model components – the different types of attitudes, influences, and social norms – are 
also the subjects of their own studies.
In this thesis, the concepts of behavioral intention and the theory of reasoned action are 
applied to crowd behavior, more specifically three common crowd dynamics.  The first and 
current section provides an overview of the types of research and the applicability of said 
research.  The second section provides background information about crowds and behavioral 
intention.  Two models of behavioral intention, the theory of reasoned action and the theory of 
planned behavior, are detailed, and the models' components of attitudes, influences, and social 
norms are each investigated further.  The third section describes some of the latest state of the art 
related research concerning behavior models and crowd dynamics, from social studies to 
proposed models to simulations in virtual environments.  The fourth section proposes a model 
for crowd behavior inspired by the theory of reasoned action and its adaptation to three scenarios 
commonly found in human societies.  Lastly, the fifth section draws some final conclusions and 
suggestions for extension and future areas of study.
3CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
The concepts of “crowd” and “intention” may seem intuitive, but nevertheless, an 
accumulated literature has served to weed out inaccuracies and misconceptions, providing a firm 
foundation on which researchers may communicate.  First, crowds are defined and their 
importance, internal processes, relationships, and simulation are investigated.  Some historical 
context is also provided, showing some trends in opinion over the past century.  Next, behavioral 
intention is described in greater detail, and various models of intention are also explored. 
Behavioral intention may be viewed as a complex web of interacting internal and external 
factors.  Among these factors are attitude, influence, and social norms.  These factors are 
examined more closely at the end of this section.
Crowds
As the world approaches (or has exceeded, by some estimates) seven billion people, 
planet Earth has become increasingly crowded.  A crowd exists wherever humans gather en 
masse: sports stadiums, stock exchange floors, enthusiasts conventions, political protests, etc. 
Musse and Thalmann (1997) define crowds as “a large group of individuals in the same physical 
environment, sharing a common goal”.  These crowds may be viewed as a hierarchy: individuals 
are collected into groups, and the resulting groups are collected into a crowd (Musse & 
Thalmann, 2001).
The ubiquity of human crowds means research and understanding has a wide variety of 
applications, from psychology to transportation research and architecture (Treuille, Cooper, & 
Popivic, 2006).  Sociologists often study crowds' responses to extreme stimuli, such as natural 
disasters and social upheaval, but Musse and Thalmann (1997) stress the importance of studying 
4normal crowd behavior.  “Normal” refers to the type of behavior that is not a response to change 
but the typical response to a constant environment.  Another reason that improving the current 
understanding of crowd behavior is so important lies with the unavoidable nature of social 
interaction.  The purest, most elemental form of individual behavior is difficult to model due to 
social interference; the complexities of interrelationships always exist (Musse & Thalmann, 
2001).  Therefore, a better understanding of crowd behavior may also reveal new avenues for 
thinking about individual behavior.
Crowd behavior is the set of actions resulting from people's intentions (i.e. planned 
actions not yet committed), beliefs (i.e. internal status), knowledge (i.e. information about the 
environment), and perceptions (i.e. sensory input of the environment).  When crowd behavior is 
treated as a set of actions, the question remains of how to interpret human control in a crowd. 
Do the actions produce effects analogous to a particle system, or maybe crowds are more akin to 
a flock or behavioral system?
Musse and Thalmann observe that these micro and macro approaches have different 
properties.  A particle system has no hierarchy and follows simple rules much like a physical 
particle system employing charged fields.  Flocks on the other hand consist of two levels, the 
flock and the agent, where individuals in the flock express limited intelligence and act according 
to their local surroundings.  Lastly, a behavioral system uses defined rules, organizational 
structures, and assumes a greater level of human intelligence of its agents than either flocks or 
particle systems.
The study of crowd behavior involves observing a variety of group effects on the crowd. 
These effects may be classified into a number of categories, among which are polarization, the 
sharing and adding effects, and domination (Musse & Thalmann, 1997).  Polarization is the 
5formation of two or more groups within the crowd that possess diverging characteristics.  The 
sharing effect involves others' actions influencing individuals, while the adding effect involves 
others' actions influencing entire groups.  The domination group effect occurs during the rise of a 
leader or leaders in the social hierarchy, their influence spreading to lower members of the 
hierarchy.
Observing the above effects and attempting to quantify them is a delicate process. 
Translating observations of real-world crowds into models and simulations can be similarly 
delicate, and Berk (1974) argues that many of the problems in simulating crowds result from 
epistemological issues.  Quantifying the concept of the mind is a difficult endeavor, especially 
when it comes to crowd behavior.  This difficulty fosters different interpretations and approaches 
to a working model, starting at a fundamental level: Berk notes that early researchers disagreed 
concerning the rationality of crowd behavior.
Reicher (2001) argues that the scarce study of crowds has largely been separated from 
psychological research.  In Le Bon's (1895) classic work on crowds, individuals lose their 
normal psychological capacities when in a crowd and act with a primal irrationality.  Individuals 
trade their sense of self and responsibility in exchange for strength of numbers, and the loss of 
self-interest leads to the irrational behavior of the group mind, even leading to putting one's own 
health at risk (similar thinking is expressed in deindividuation theory).  Into the early 1900s, 
crowd psychology consisted merely of explanations that served only to reinforce unscientific 
assumptions about crowd behavior; the crowd was anonymous, random, and unknowable 
(Reicher, 2001).  Reicher's main criticism of this approach is that Le Bon's arguments are too 
divorced from social context and give the crowd too much credit for its behavior.
6Two principles which support the above criticism have grown stronger over the past 
century.  The first principle is that crowd behavior mirrors its culture and society.  Reicher 
provides an example of the English food riots in the early 1800s.  The riots were triggered not by 
primitive hunger but by the social transition to a market-based economy and the wrongdoing 
perceived by the population.  The second principle is that crowd behavior in turn alters society. 
The resulting social changes of the crowd-society relationship may be viewed on three levels.  At 
the individual level, crowd behavior changes how people view themselves as social actors; 
participation strengthens ideology.  Secondly, crowds serve as a fertile ground for new ideas to 
develop and spread.  Lastly and most drastically, crowds can alter whole societies.  Reicher 
points to any revolution for evidence of the powerful potential inherent in a crowd-society 
relationship.
In addition to Le Bon's idea of the irrational group mind, another common theme in early 
crowd research is that collective behavior entails deviant behavior (Couch, 1968).  This theme 
followed from how Le Bon viewed collective behavior as a pathological form of behavior. 
Among these old ideas, Couch identifies several stereotypes and provides arguments against 
them.  The suggestibility stereotype indicates that the passions of the crowd cause it to be easily 
manipulated by outside forces.  Couch counters that if crowds are so suggestible, then why do 
outside authorities have so many problems dispersing them?  Crowds are often ill prone to 
acquiesce to authority.  Against the destructiveness stereotype, while the crowd may be 
responsible for relatively minor property damage, most of the destruction is caused by the 
established authority which often causes loss of life.  Against the emotionality stereotype, the 
forces acting against the crowd are often as emotional as the crowd they face, and individuals 
often encounter emotionally charged situations outside the crowd, so there is little to distinguish 
7the emotion in a crowd from any other emotional event.  Couch too suggests abandoning the line 
of thought that crowd behavior is abnormal and instead recognize crowds as a legitimate social 
system with unique qualities.
Granovetter (1978) proposes an improvement to the classic way of thinking about 
collective behavior, that collective behavior somehow strips away “civilized” behavior and 
exposes some feral element underneath.  Instead, outcomes are explained by norms, beliefs, 
preferences, motives, etc., and failing crowd norms and beliefs are replaced with new ones. 
However, knowing the new (or possibly old) norms and beliefs is necessary but not sufficient for 
explaining outcomes.  Also needed is a model for how individual preferences interact with each 
other.  This model differs from a simple “everyone joined group A because they all believed in 
A”. Instead, it addresses how a heterogeneous collection of beliefs interacts and aggregates 
across a rational, heterogeneous population.
Thresholds form a crucial part of Granovetter's model for decision-making processes. 
For example, should a person join a riot?  The affirmative decision becomes more appealing as 
the size of the riot increases; a larger riot means a lesser chance of getting personally identified 
and apprehended.  Even individuals with opposing beliefs may find themselves in the same 
crowd if they possess similar thresholds.  Granovetter suggests a variety of applicable situations 
for the threshold model: “diffusion of innovations” such as technology adoption, population 
migration, leaving a social gathering, the voting bandwagon effect, worker strikes, etc.  Other 
examples include the spread of rumors, where people need to hear from multiple sources before 
believing new information, and the spread of diseases, where people need to contact a number of 
infected before contracting the illness.
8The above discussion of crowds has proposed a few arguments against the early ideas of 
crowd irrationality and deviancy.  If at one end of the spectrum is impulsive crowds acting in a 
haze of passion, then at the other end of the spectrum is the use of game theory and its rational 
players' strategies used to describe crowd behavior.  In decision theory, a player acts to 
maximizes rewards or minimize costs.  Berk (1974) approaches crowd behavior using both 
decision theory and collective decision-making, crediting individuals with a large degree of 
rationality.  It should be noted, however, that it is possible to simultaneously act rationally and 
incorrectly and that the rationality of a person may be measured in degrees.
Treated as a game, a player is a single person, and individuals increase their payoffs when 
they collaborate.  This rationality is justified by a series of examples where groups of people are 
intuitively attributed as incapable of rational behavior but exhibit the opposite.  Mental patients 
have been observed to develop a value system that minimizes discipline by authorities while 
simultaneously maximizing their ability to coerce each other.  Other examples include the 
calculation behind conflict among gang members, the proposed rational self-interest in juvenile 
property crimes, and civil disorders that communicate social problems to an outside audience.
While crowds may be naturally observed in the real world, simulating models on a 
computer serves as a way to more easily compare model behavior with observed behavior.  The 
simulation of crowds started gaining momentum in the 1990s due to the rise in cheap computing 
power and research's applicability to planning areas for human traffic (Briano & Revetria, 2008). 
The simulation of human crowds, however, is made difficult by both complexity and subtlety 
(Treuille et al., 2006).  An individual's motion and their interaction with the surrounding 
environment is relatively simple in simulation; the interactions and relationships between a 
network of individuals is not.
9One popular type of model used in computer simulations is the agent-based system. 
Agent-based simulations possess a strength for mirroring real-world individual decisions.  They 
account for each individual's unique state and allow for unique parameters which lead to 
interesting heterogeneous behavior.  However, agent-based simulations can be difficult to 
develop behavioral rules for and are computationally expensive.  Local path planning often 
yields unrealistic movement as well.
Realistic movement involves simulated crowd behaviors consistent with observed real-
world crowds using collision avoidance and response at the individual level (Pelechano, Allbeck, 
& Badler, 2007).  Animating a large crowd involves studying locomotion, path planning, and 
navigation as well as simulating behavior using cognitive models.  Different model approaches 
struggle in different ways to define the motion of a crowd of agents.  The social forces model 
looks approximately like particle movement; it is unrealistic but handles high densities.  Rule-
based models typically do not use collision detection or repulsion, instead using waiting rules 
which work better with low-density crowds.  They are realistic but work best when handling low 
densities.  Cellular automata models limit spatial movement to a grid.  This cell grid interferes 
with high-density crowds, causing it to be both unrealistic and best for low densities.
Behavioral Intention
Human decision behavior has been studied by researchers hailing from a variety of fields: 
artificial intelligence, psychology, cognitive science, and decision science (Lee & Son, 2008). 
This research has also yielded a variety of behavior models.  For simulating crowd behavior, Lee 
and Son used the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) framework.  The BDI model is based on folk 
psychology, meaning it does not use cognition theories which incorporate the physical processes 
of thought.  Instead, it describes human behavior and reasoning using terms common in human 
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language: belief is the information assumed by the individual and may be incomplete or 
incorrect, desire is the state a person wishes to achieve, and intention is the person's committed 
desire.  Using the BDI model as inspiration, Briano and Revetria (2008) worked with another 
framework called PECS (Physical, Emotional, Cognitive, Social).  An evolution of the BDI 
framework, the PECS model incorporates human social behavior.
The Theory of Reasoned Action
Another model for human behavior is the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), developed 
by Ajzen and Fishbein (1981).  In the TRA, behavioral decisions are determined by intention. 
Intention in turn is composed of two components: attitude, which Bock et al. (2005) describe as 
“behavioral beliefs”, and social norms, which Bock et al. describe as reflections of “normative 
beliefs and [the] motivation to comply with [those] beliefs”.  Muduganti, Sogani, and Hexmoor 
(2005) take these terms and interpret behavioral intention as the weighted sum of attributes 
shown in Equation 1.  When endogenous attitude is affected by outside social forces, subjective 
norms in the TRA serve the purpose of bridging the gap between attitude and behavior (Ryan, 
1982).
Equation 1. A Behavioral Intention Model. Behavioral intention is represented as a weighted sum 
of attributes.
As the TRA's focus is on behavioral intention, a distinction should be made between 
behavioral intention and goal intention (Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 1988).  Behavioral 
intention is limited to an individual's committed desire to perform an action and does not involve 
what the longer term goals resulting from that action may be.  As an example from the domain of 
Behavioral intention=Weight Attitude∗Attitude
+Weight Subjective Norms∗Subjective Norms+Error
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education, a behavioral intention may be to attend class.  This differs from the goal intention of 
attaining an A grade, which is a possible outcome of the behavior.
Ryan (1982) argues that belief formation and change drive the TRA forward and 
distinguishes between different types of beliefs.  Descriptive beliefs are formed by direct 
experience.  Information beliefs involve accepted information from an indirect source, while 
inferential beliefs are derived via inference.  These inferential forces allow attitudinal beliefs and 
normative beliefs to affect each other.
Bock et al. (2005) also identify different motivational forces behind intention, which they 
divide into three categories: economic, social-psychological, and sociological.  Economic forces 
exist when people are motivated by some form of utility, such as wealth, resources, or other 
forms of satisfaction.  Social-psychological forces spur people to action because, by 
participating, people feel better about themselves and desire to strengthen their relationship with 
others as well as their access to the benefits such a relationship may entail.  Lastly, sociological 
forces improve the working atmosphere of the organization.  Bock et al. include terms such as 
“fairness, innovativeness, and affiliation” in this latter category.
The TRA has been used with success to model consumer behavior (Sheppard et al., 
1988).  Not only predicting intention and behavior, the TRA located consumers' attempts to 
change their behavior, answering the where and how of behavioral change in relatively simple 
terms.  With these results, Sheppard et al. summarize the goal of the TRA as:
[to] predict the performance of any voluntary act, unless intent changes prior to 
performance or unless the intention measure does not correspond to the behavioral  
criterion in terms of action, target, context, time-frame and/or specificity. (p. 325; 
emphasis theirs)
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As long as the component terms are used within limits of compatibility, the TRA becomes a 
powerful tool in predicting human behavior and revealing the process by which that behavior 
arose.
Interest also exists in testing the limits of this model by applying it to situations 
somewhat outside the familiar framework, such as when committed actions are not entirely under 
the performer's control or when the target person is not in a situation to possess a fully formed 
intention.  Since the model applies only to behavioral intention, the model's power weakens from 
interference by external factors, otherwise known as uncertainty in the intention-performance 
relationship.  As an example in consumer behavior, a person may have the intention to buy a 
certain item, but the item may become too expensive or is physically unavailable.  Therefore, the 
intention cannot lead to the desired action.
Since the TRA concerns itself with a single behavior, modifications need to be introduced 
for choosing among alternatives.  Sheppard et al. mention a greedy approach in which intention 
is measured towards each competing option and the strongest one is chosen.  Another method 
selects the choice with the most positive attitude and subjective norm.
The TRA model struggles to represent the importance of intending actions which are 
doomed to failure as well as the consequences of that failure.  A distinction needs to be made 
between behavioral intention and committed intention; the model weakens when predicting what 
a person actually ends up doing.  An intention may fail due to the reasons described above: 
uncontrollable interference or choosing an alternative.  In these situations, intentions should 
become estimates, and estimates require additional considerations.
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The Theory of Planned Behavior
To address some of these identified weaknesses, Ajzen (1991) proposed the Theory of 
Planned Behavior (TPB) which is an extension of the theory of reasoned action.  The TPB 
focuses on what Ajzen calls “cognitive self-regulation”, using a dispositional approach to 
prediction.  The theory still measures behavioral intention, what Ajzen calls “motivational factors 
that influence a behavior”, but it incorporates Perceived Behavioral Control (PCB) into the 
model, the belief in ease of execution of a behavior.  The concept of PBC originates from 
previous studies investigating behavioral control's relationship with predicting behavior.  For 
example, Ajzen and Madden (1986) demonstrated that the addition of behavioral control 
contributed to the more accurate predicting of class attendance and final grades in students.  As 
in the TRA, attitudes and subjective norms continue their role as predictors in the TPB.
Both the TRA and TPB imply that a person's attitudes are formed after careful 
consideration of the available information (Conner & Sparks, 2005).  General attitudes on their 
own fail to accurately predict specific behaviors (Ajzen, 1991).  Traits, discussed in the 
“Attitude” section, similarly fail.  One workaround to this problem has been to combine many 
behaviors together and use the aggregate as an indicator of behavioral disposition, but this overly 
broadens predictive power.  Generalizations and aggregations may not help directly with 
specifics, but they do inform other factors that do help with specifics.  Behavioral intention 
serves as a buffer between attitudes and behavior since attitudes were found to poorly predict 
behavior directly (Conner & Sparks, 2005).  However, how attitudes translate into intentions is 
less clear.  Conner stresses the need for compatibility, “when both are assessed at the same level 
of specificity with regard to [action, target, context, and time]”.
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An attitude may be viewed as the sum of products: beliefs that an action will lead to some 
consequence times the evaluation of that consequence.  This calculation is not performed by the 
individual every single time but rather is stored in memory.  A subjective norm may be viewed as 
another sum of products: the perceived significant other's normative belief times the motivation 
to comply with the significant other.  In this case, the distinction between normative beliefs and 
behavioral beliefs may be arbitrary, but the distinction is still useful.  Lastly, PBC may also be 
viewed as a sum of products: the frequency of a factor times the inhibiting (or promoting) power 
of that factor.  These products often possess weights which vary by the target person and 
behavior.
Also important to the model are salient beliefs, the subset of beliefs that a person uses in 
a given situation (Ajzen, 1991).  Ajzen distinguishes between three kinds of salient beliefs: 
behavioral, normative, and control.  Each type of salient belief corresponds to a component of 
the TPB.  Behavioral beliefs inform attitudes.  Normative beliefs inform subjective norms, and 
control beliefs inform perceptions of behavioral control.
Ajzen stresses that given different situations, the above components may have varying 
levels of importance and admits that the relationship between the factors requires greater 
understanding.  Since PBC was introduced to account for factors outside a person's control, 
situations where a person has a high degree of volitional control typically weakens the predictive 
power of PBC (Armitage & Conner, 2001).  Similarly, in situations where intention has little 
effect on behavior (situations with low volitional control), PCB has a direct relationship with 
behavior.  The TPB may also have a weakness in not accounting for past behavior, which is 
arguably the best predictor of future behavior (Armitage, 2005).  Armitage points to such related 
15
phenomena as habit formation and “practice makes perfect”, where in the latter, repetition leads 
to mastery which leads to an increase in perceived behavioral control.
Attitude
Described earlier as “behavioral beliefs”, attitudes are the psychological constructs used 
to describe an individual's perspective towards their material and immaterial environment.  Ajzen 
and Fishbein (2005) identify two types of attitude.  The first type consists of general attitudes 
towards physical objects, social groups, events, or other general targets, while the second type 
consists of specific attitudes towards specific behaviors with respect to similar targets. 
Describing attitudes as the modern day “crown jewel” of social psychology, Crano and Prislin 
(2006) write that an attitude represents “an evaluative integration of cognitions and affects 
experienced in relation to an object”.  Varying the strength of an attitude also varies an 
evaluation's persistence and the consistency of the attitude-behavior relationship.
Ajzen (2005) defines attitude as a “latent, hypothetical construct” which affects entities in 
observable ways.  This reduced definition applies to traits as well, but traits and attitudes are 
distinguished by their internalized direction.  Where traits point inwards towards the individual, 
attitudes are directed outwards into the environment.  Attitudinal responses evaluate an object, 
i.e. to have an opinion about something, where traits inform the tendency of a response, e.g. to be 
cautious.  Attitudes are considered more prone to change given new input.  Traits, however, are 
less mercurial.
Directed towards some external object, attitudes are measured by the individual’s 
responses to the object, which Ajzen divides into three categories.  Cognitive responses perceive 
object characteristics.  Affective responses indicate a change in the individual's emotional state. 
Conative responses encompass any potential or executed actions towards the object.  Classifying 
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responses into these three categories may require subjectivity, especially when distinguishing 
cognitive and affective reactions.  Which is chiefly responsible in a given situation: the 
metaphorical “heart” or “head”?
The three attitudinal responses may also be interpreted as three components that work 
together to form an attitude.  Ajzen describes this relationship as a hierarchy, where the 
cognitive, affective, and conative components form the first-order factors and attitude is the 
second-order factor.  When a response is measured using this structure, the observed attitude 
predisposes the three categories of responses.  Predisposition does not imply universal 
agreement, however.  For example, an alcoholic may possess an emotional reliance on alcohol 
despite knowing that the substance ultimately causes harm.  Though there are such exceptions, 
correlation among the three components is the rule.
The process by which an attitude forms should be distinguished from the process by 
which an attitude changes (Crano & Prislin, 2006).  Attitude formation results from conditioning 
or even mere exposure to a received message.  Attitude change, on the other hand, may be a bit 
more involved and is represented by two types of models.  Dual-process models, as the name 
suggests, use a two-step process of message reception followed by attitude change.  Examples 
include the elaboration likelihood model and the heuristic/systematic model.  Single-process 
models use a single cognitive process that accounts for both source and message effects.  An 
example single-process model is the cognition in persuasion model.
The study of attitudes formed the original basis of social psychological research (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 2005).  From the 1930s to the 1970s, however, attitudes were shown to be poor 
predictors of behavior, and the relevance of the attitude construct in predicting behavior was 
called into question.  The attitude-behavior inconsistencies came in two varieties: literal 
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inconsistencies, where intentions do not lead to action, and evaluative inconsistencies, where the 
expressed attitude does not lead to action.
Proposed reasons for the attitude-behavior inconsistencies included response biases.  To 
avoid biased responses, researchers attempted to use indirect approaches for gathering data, but 
the updated results proved no more valid.  Another explanation attributed the inconsistencies to 
the single dimensionality of attitude.  Attitude was believed to be multi-faceted, a property which 
may have been lost when expressed in a single value.  This gave rise to attitudinal components: 
cognitive (logical attitudes), affective (emotional attitudes), and conative (volitional attitudes). 
These measures, however, strongly intercorrelated and still could not account for the 
inconsistencies.
To overcome these problems, the limits of attitudes must be understood.  Ajzen and 
Fishbein explain that attitudes despite the problems above can still predict behavior but only if 
the behavior broadly represents the attitude domain.  This idea leads to the principle of 
aggregation, that attitudes indicate broad behavioral dispositions, and the principle of 
compatibility, that attitude and behavior must involve the same action, target, context, and time. 
Using the principles of aggregation and compatibility, the resulting attitude-behavior consistency 
possesses three categories of moderators: meta-attitudinal, self-interest, and assessment related 
(Crano & Prislin, 2006).  Example moderators include accessibility, certainty, temporal stability, 
etc.
Recent research on attitudes has investigated the difference between deliberate attitudes 
and automatic attitudes, also known as explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes, respectively 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).  Explicit attitudes involve self-reported evaluations, while 
implicit attitudes are inferred from response latency measures.  Modern persuasion models have 
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performed well in explaining how different messages influence explicit messages.  Implicit 
attitude changes, however, are less understood.  Gawronski and Bodenhausen suggest that this 
lack of understanding is due to much of the research either not making the required distinctions 
or assuming implicit attitudes are stable, resulting from long-term experiences.
Influence
Regardless of the situation, if two individuals are within proximity to each other, the 
effects of influence are inevitable (DePaulo & Friedman, 1998).  Influence is the tendency for 
one to complement, reciprocate, converge, or compensate their behavior given the behavior of 
another.  Therefore, influence is a form of coordination, and as an individual’s social network 
changes, so too does the experienced influence.
The power of influence should not be underestimated.  Kahan (1997) argued that when 
considering committing a crime, the debate within the individual is not limited to weighing the 
costs and benefits of the crime itself.  Supplementing criminal behavior are the forces of social 
influence and the criminal tendencies of other individuals.  The power of social influence on 
criminal behavior has even been used as extenuating factors in murder trials (Colman, 1991).  As 
such, a society wishing to deter criminal behavior should enact laws that not only inflict penalties 
on the perpetrator but also mold the population's social weight ascribed to the crime (Kahan, 
1997).
Behaviors driven by social influence may be viewed as goal-oriented (Cialdini & Trost, 
1998).  The force of social influence is strongest when a behavior services multiple goals. 
Cialdini and Trost list three goal categories: “to behave effectively, to build and maintain 
relationships, and to manage self-concept”.  Effective behavior is a rational goal because it 
allows people to reap greater payoffs from their actions.  Social relationships need to be built and 
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maintained due to the perceived social rewards that come with conformity, as social deviants are 
shunned.  The dominant culture is not necessarily the target of conformity; the higher valued 
culture of a peer group may substitute.  The third goal category, self-concept, is the positive 
image of oneself, i.e. self-esteem or an established identity.  Without an objective means to 
establish self-concept, one must look to similar others as a means for self-evaluation.
Social influence consists of three major components: social norms, conformity, and 
compliance.  (Social norms are addressed in the next section.)  Conformity involves changing 
one's behavior to match the behavior of others (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004), and serves three 
powerful personal goals: to improve accuracy of perception, gain approval of desirable others, 
and to avoid a deviant self-concept (Cialdini & Trost, 1998).  When the motivation is to increase 
correctness of perceptions and behavior, the influence component is known as informational 
conformity (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).  When the motivation is to gain societal approval, it is 
known as normative conformity.  These two motivations, while conceptually distinct, appear 
with less distinction theoretically and empirically, and overall, the goal of accuracy simply 
causes one to conform to a perceived consensus.
The last major component of social influence, compliance, refers to an acquiescence to a 
request, either implicitly or explicitly (Cialdini & Trost, 1998).  Cialdini and Trost list six 
psychological principles popular among compliance professionals: reciprocity, consistency, 
social validation, liking, authority, and scarcity.  Compliance, like conformity, also has a goal of 
accuracy (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).  A rational individual desires to achieve goals efficiently 
and reap the most rewards, and to do so requires interpreting information accurately.  By 
complying with incoming messages, the expected result is to improve accuracy of perceptions. 
Another goal of compliance is the goal of affiliation.  A fundamental aspect of humans is to 
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associate with one another.  By complying with social cues, the expected result is to build a 
stronger social network.
Influence is not necessarily a one-way process with the large group influencing the small 
group; it works both ways (Cialdini & Trost, 1998).  During conflict arising from challenging the 
status quo, an individual may choose the minority opinion, which confers some informational 
advantage (a process known as “conversion”).  The majority opinion may also be a viable option 
when it offers a larger network of social support (a form of compliance).  When a majority 
opinion is contrary to a person's existing beliefs, a comparison process begins where internal 
ideals are compared to the external ideals of the majority opinion.  When a contrary minority 
opinion is perceived, the individual undergoes a more rigorous validation process that tests for 
accuracy.  After this process, the message is either internalized or rejected.  However, a 
distinction should be made between internalization and the public expression of an internal 
status.  Majority influences appear to favor both public and private, direct forms of expression, 
while minority influences favor private, indirect expression.  No matter the case, when accuracy 
is the salient goal, people tend to rely on the consensus heuristic/majority position.
The consensus heuristic, however, does not guarantee accuracy.  Postmes, Spears, and 
Cihangir (2001) investigated the effect of group norms on the quality of group decisions, more 
specifically the effect of consensus norms versus critical thought.  It was found that groups 
relying on consensus norms unreliably arrived at correct decisions.  The poor performance of 
consensus groups was attributed to their preference for shared information, i.e. they overvalued 
information known to all group members.  Though consensus norms are the result of group 
cohesion, Postmes et al. argue that cohesion is ultimately not the source of poor decisions. 
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Rather, a group’s history plays an important role in the formation of consensus norms, critical 
group norms, and the quality of group decisions.
Helbing and Molnar (1995) incorporated concepts from social influences into a social 
force model.  The social force model subjects pedestrians to social forces and has been shown to 
describe self-organization of observed pedestrian behavior.  This pedestrian model shares many 
similarities with the behavior of gases and fluids.  People are simulated as particles that behave 
according to social rules, i.e. changes in velocity are attributed to changes in motivation, not 
changes in physical force applied to the person (Kirkland & Maciejewski, 2003).
Using three different types of force terms, the model's forces are a measure of internal 
motivations to move a certain way (Helbing & Molnar, 1995).  Each particle is motivated to 
acquire a certain velocity which represents the rational desire to take the shortest route at a 
comfortable speed.  Particles also maintain a certain distance from other pedestrians and 
environmental borders.  This represents the “private sphere” or “territorial effect” of the 
pedestrian.  Getting too close to these spheres increases discomfort, caused in part by the 
increased risk of collision.  Particles also respond to different types of attractive effects which 
represent movements towards friends, a street performer, a visually appealing window display, 
etc.
Social Norms
A standard part of collective action theory, the zero contribution thesis postulates that 
rational agents require externally enforced rules in order to cooperate and achieve group 
interests, even when the group interests would benefit the rational agent (Ostrom, 2000). 
Situations involving the zero contribution thesis have the structure of an n-person prisoner's 
dilemma game.  Despite the dilemma, cooperative behavior is observably widespread.  People 
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have been commonly observed to organize themselves to benefit the group.  Examples include 
labor unions, tax payers, voters, etc.  Research has struggled to synthesize this observed behavior 
with the zero contribution thesis into a revised theory of collective action.  Among the proposed 
revisions is to add two additional types of norm-using players which facilitate opportunities for 
collective action and cooperation: conditional cooperators and willing punishers.  How did these 
types of players come into existence?  An evolutionary approach proposes humans evolved to 
naturally learn social norms and indirectly to generate norm-using players.
In cooperation norms, the use of sanctions is a key part of enforcement and may even be 
driven by non-selfish motives (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004).  Human cooperation is based 
specifically on the conditional cooperation norm: cooperate if the group cooperates; defect if the 
group defects.  Conditional cooperators are players that cooperate only when they believe others 
will reciprocate (Ostrom, 2000).  They compose a large proportion of the population, 
experiments suggesting 40-60 percent.  Such players occupy an important roll in the early rounds 
of games by convincing others to contribute.  The threshold in required belief that others will 
reciprocate varies over the population.  Regardless of the threshold, accumulated disappointment 
leads to decreased numbers of participating conditional cooperators.  Therefore, it is beneficial to 
incorporate mechanisms that prevent this downward cascade.
The second type of norm-using player is the willing punisher.  Willing punishers punish 
those who under-perform or free ride.  Free riders are a common problem in cooperative 
scenarios that involve the public good problem, where a good becomes “public” when no group 
member can be excluded from the good's consumption (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004).  Punishment 
often takes the form of sanctions and is an important component of an organization's survival 
(Ostrom, 2000).  One common form of punishment is shame.  Shame is not equivalent to guilt, 
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the former being imposed by others, while the latter is a self-imposed punishment for failing to 
uphold a social norm.  Willing punishers may also reward those who perform above the 
minimum required, assuming the role of “willing rewarders”.
Conditional cooperators and willing punishers may use social norms to promote 
collective action, but what exactly defines a social norm?  Kandori (1992) defines social norms 
as “the specification of desirable behavior together with sanction rules in a community”.  Social 
norms are an understanding shared across a group of people concerning which actions are 
required, acceptable, or forbidden (Ostrom, 2000) and generally consist of the traditions and 
taboos within a society (Cialdini & Trost, 1998).  However, a social norm consists not of codified 
laws but of understood rules and expectations of behavior, deriving its power from the social 
network, not the legal system.  A norm is considered “social” when it is shared by multiple 
people and is sustained by the people's approval or disapproval (Elster, 1989).  It should be noted 
that individuals within a society may adhere to norms to different degrees and that norms may be 
more representative of the collective as a whole rather than a random member individual 
(Cialdini & Trost, 1998).  Individuals use the norms of their peers as the standard by which they 
assess their own behavior (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007).  The 
group affected by a social norm can vary widely in size, from a small family to a national society 
(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004).
Social norms, though frequently discussed and used in research, still require additional 
study in terms of their origins, what defines their content, and how they are enforced. 
Concerning origins, social norms may form whenever an individual's action affects others in a 
positive or negative way, though Fehr and Fischbacher admit this view is not wholly 
uncontested.  A norm may arise from survival techniques, which evolve into traditions distanced 
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from their original function (Cialdini & Trost, 1998).  Another possibility is that norms arise 
from a set of rules that society has agreed upon, forming the standard of interaction between 
individuals.  From a societal-value perspective, social norms originate arbitrarily and gain power 
through cultural acceptance.  Therefore, the social norm is not inherently beneficial.  Antithetical 
to this approach, social norms may originate from behaviors that accomplish group goals, 
proposing an inherent beneficial quality to the social norm.
Social norms are compatible with the economics axiom that agents are rational (Kandori, 
1992).  Therefore, social norms must exist because the self-interested community sustains them. 
They must provide certain benefits to those that follow them, what Kandori calls “proper 
incentives... in every respect”.  To provide such incentives, deviants must be punished and the 
failure to punish must also be punished.
Two opposing lines of thought straddle the extreme ends of economic theory (Elster, 
1989).  On one end is Adam Smith's instrumental rationality, that human behavior is pulled by 
the prospect of future rewards.  On the other end is Emile Durkheim, who advocated social 
norms as a behavioral motivator, that humans are pushed from behind by “quasi-inertial forces”. 
These opposing views draw the distinction that social norms are not outcome-oriented like 
typical rational actions.  Rather, they are either unconditional or the conditions are not future-
oriented, fueled by the strong emotions that they can trigger.  However, social norms can be 
guided by self-interest when self-interest determines which norms among many are chosen for a 
given situation.
The above principles separate social norms from other types of norms.  Where social 
norms are not outcome-oriented, moral norms involve consequences and outcomes.  Legal norms 
require an enforcer motivated by self-interest, whereas social norms are enforced by community 
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sanctions.  Private norms are similarly enforced by guilt but typically are not shared with others. 
Additionally, social norms should be distinguished from habits and compulsive neuroses which 
are kept private and do not generate guilt on their own.
Social norms both incite and guide human action (Schultz et al., 2007).  Therefore, they 
have actively been used in marketing campaigns and used as a tool in changing drug and alcohol 
consumption, eating disorders, gambling, littering, etc.  Normative messages deployed in the 
field have had mixed success in changing behavior, sometimes encountering boomerang effects 
where the person affected acts in an opposite manner in order to assert their freedom.
In broadcasting normative messages, it is important to distinguish between the different 
types of social norms a message may target.  The following norm types, however, are not disjoint 
sets (Cialdini & Trost, 1998).  Some messages target the descriptive norm, a behavioral factor 
that describes “perception of prevalence”, the behavior common to a given situation (Schultz et 
al., 2007).  Descriptive norm messaging may attempt to correct the perception that certain 
behaviors are more widespread than they actually are.  However, since deviant behavior is 
considered to be both above or below the descriptive norm, the message may discourage some 
while actually encouraging others.  Aside from descriptive norms, other messages target the 
injunctive norm, what Schultz et al. describe as “perceptions of what is commonly approved or 
disapproved within a culture”.  Injunctive normative messages can reduce the boomerang effect 
by strengthening an injunctive norm so that it overrides a related descriptive norm.  Lastly, the 
subjective norm, defined by the belief that others desire a certain course of action, is particularly 
important in predicting behaviors and intentions (Cialdini & Trost, 1998).  Defining a subjective 
norm using other norms is relatively simple.  The target individual determines the injunctive 
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norms of significant others in their social network and the others' willingness to adhere to those 
norms.  This perception of other's injunctive norms results in a subjective norm.
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CHAPTER 3
RELATED WORK
In this section a survey of related work pertaining to behavior models, behavioral 
intention, and crowd simulation is described and discussed.  The behavior models interpret 
human action in some interesting ways, and they are accompanied by practical applications and 
meta-analyses.  Following the studies of intention, a more in-depth look of the studies of crowds 
is performed, beginning with crowd formation and transitioning into crowd simulation, human 
user involvement, macro-level approaches, and simulated evacuations.
Behavior Models
The theory of reasoned action has inspired many models for human behavior.  The 
technology acceptance model draws inspiration from the TRA (Schepers & Wetzels, 2007).  In 
the technology acceptance model, “perceived usefulness” and “perceived ease of use” gauge an 
individual's attitude towards the use of a technology.  The subjective norm's predictive power in 
this model has possessed mixed results.  Schepers' and Wetzels' meta-analysis of a variety of 
studies showed, however, that the subjective norm possessed significant influence over perceived 
usefulness of a technology and the behavioral intention to use that technology.
Another model related to the the theory of reasoned action is the MODE model, which 
stands for “Motivation and Opportunity as DEterminants” (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999).  The 
MODE model typically requires broad motivations to be accurate.  In the MODE model, 
attitudes are activated either consciously or spontaneously, and the activated attitude biases 
perception of information concerning the attitude object (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005).  This 
property of attitudes results in the model distinguishing between two classes of attitude-behavior 
processes (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999).  The first class is behaviors involving conscious 
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deliberation.  In this class, relevant attitudes are compared to the behavior in question, and 
alternative behaviors are considered.  The second class is spontaneous reaction where attitudes 
immediately inform a behavior without being consciously considered.  Ajzen and Fishbein 
(2005) concede the work shows encouraging results but point out the model's assumption that 
only strong attitudes (as opposed to all attitudes) are activated may be false.  They also indicate 
other issues with linking general attitudes to specific behaviors.
Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) also worked with attitudes, proposing the 
associative-propositional evaluation model which assumes a distinction between explicit and 
implicit attitudes. In doing so, it provides theoretical backing for ideas such as evaluative 
conditioning, cognitive dissonance, priming, and persuasion.
Lee and Son (2008) attempted to build a comprehensive model for human decision 
behavior (which includes decision making and decision planning), integrating aspects of 
previous models which Lee and Son categorize as engineering, psychological, and economical. 
Their model used Bayesian belief networks, decision field theory, and probabilistic depth first 
search.  Their extensions to the BDI framework showed promising results of simulated human 
behavior in dynamic and intricate situations.
Similarly, Cho et al. (2008) used the BDI framework for crowd simulation.  In their 
model-based approach, an agent's beliefs represented their perceptions of the environment, while 
their desires and intentions represented candidate and selected actions, respectively.  This 
perception-action relationship empowered agents to adaptively react to a dynamic environment. 
Two weaknesses to their approach, however, were the lack sequential actions and cooperative 
leadership.  Cho et al. suggest the addition of planning mechanisms to strengthen the model.
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Bock et al. (2005) observed diffusion of knowledge within a firm where knowledge was 
stored within individuals and must be shared across the organization.  They found that people are 
prone to hoard knowledge rather than share it and are influenced by personal and contextual 
forces.  Even if there exists a system to share knowledge, people have to be encouraged to use it, 
and counter to intuition, extrinsic rewards may actually suppress an individual's tendency to 
share knowledge.  Bock et al. interviewed executives concerned with knowledge management to 
determine motivations and beliefs of individuals.  They classified the types of motivational 
forces into three categories (see the “Background” section) and hypothesized that increasing 
these motivational forces would lead to a greater intention to share knowledge.
Muduganti, Sogani, and Hexmoor (2005) attempted to better understand the reasons why 
people are accepting of certain technologies while rejecting others.  Also under investigation was 
what causes the “middle ground” situation of a technology being used for a short time or 
experiencing an oscillating degree of use.  Attitudes, subjective norms, and behavioral intentions 
were distributed on a bell curve ranging from 1 to 7, while an error term ranged from -1 to 1. 
The subjective norm was adjusted when intention exceeded a threshold.  One of the goals was to 
avoid the use of cumbersome questionnaires to gather data, instead using a computer model.  The 
model tried to improve beyond existing models of user acceptance of information technology. 
Causal models were considered too “cross-sectional” and temporally “static”, while individual 
reasoning models' narrow focus missed social influences and group decision making.
In other work with behavioral intention, Ryan (1982) explored the model by testing for 
variable interdependencies.  The resulting data indicated that the interdependencies were very 
complex and formed a variable network.  Why not combine the variables if they are so related? 
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Ryan argued that the data indicated variables that were “distinct but related” and that the merging 
of variables would be an oversimplification.
Sheppard, Hartwick, and Warshaw (1988) analyzed the TRA in terms of its applications 
to situations not entirely suited to the original framework.  They surveyed a long list of previous 
studies and assessed the intention-performance relationship as well as the attitude/subjective 
norm-intention relationship.  Ultimately, they found many instances where researchers may have 
stretched the model's capabilities a bit far, yet the model's predictive power did not collapse 
under the stress.
The elements of the TPB – attitudes, subjective norms, and PBC – have been used to 
predict non-donors' intentions to donate blood (Robinson, Masser, White, Hyde, & Terry, 2008). 
Robinson et al. proposed that the subjective norm may inconsistently contribute to the predictive 
power of the TPB when surveying donors and non-donors.  They extended the TPB by adding 
factors known to be important in blood donor research: descriptive norms (what behavior 
significant others ultimately choose), moral norms (the moral obligation to donate blood), 
anticipated regret (an affective component), and donation anxiety (another affective component). 
A questionnaire was used to measure the above components on a 1 to 7 scale.  In the end, the 
extended model performed better than the original standard model with 70% variance in 
donation intention accounted for.  Also, it was found that negative feelings of regret made strong 
motivators to donate blood.
The TPB has also been used in the domain of physical activity research (Armitage, 2005). 
Regular physical activity is an excellent cancer and disease deterrent, yet many people still do 
not get enough exercise.  While the TPB has been successfully used to predict initiation of an 
exercise plan, Armitage was curious about longer term maintenance.  The paper addresses two 
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TPB limitations in particular: the TPB's ability to predict sustained physical activity as 
mentioned above and the TPB's weakness in not using past behavior information.  Results 
showed that PBC was a very important contributor to committing exercise, and that a successful 
exercise plan also enhanced PBC.
The TPB has been tested by meta-analysis for its effectiveness (Armitage & Conner, 
2001).  Armitage and Conner collected 185 studies and tracked how well results were predicted 
by the TPB.  The model was found to account for 27% variance in behavior and 39% variance in 
intention.  PBC accounted for more variance in studies where behavior measures were self-
reported as opposed to objectively reported or observed.  It was also determined that the 
subjective norm was a weak predictor in intention, but this may have been due to poor measuring 
techniques or the construct of subjective norms requiring expansion.
Crowd Models
The nature of the crowd's life cycle, how crowds form and disperse, has accrued some 
interest.  Lacks, Gordon, and McCue (2005) investigated crowd formation at the scene of a 
crime.  They discovered a relationship between the nature of a homicide, the resulting crowd 
size, and how that crowd interacts with law enforcement.  Murder scenes provoked increasingly 
unusual behavior from gathering crowds, indicating the emergence of new norms in the society.
Christou (2010) observed that the life cycle of a crowd is composed of three basic stages. 
Crowds start with the individual, which grows into a crowd (i.e. “formation”) and eventually 
decays back into separate individuals (i.e. “dispersion”) as shown in Figure 1.  The goal of the 
project was to build a generic model representing these stages and transitions.  Individuals in the 
model are represented as a vector of attribute values and a personal goal they need to achieve. 
Crowds are then formed by a set of individuals with similar goals; the crowd disperses after the 
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goal is satisfied.  The model was applied to situations of crowd formation around a point of 
interest, e.g. a car accident, and the crowd continued to grow due to a compulsion by people to 
join crowds even if they cannot perceive the original point of interest.
Figure 1. The Crowd Life Cycle Model. Crowds form and disperse in response to a variety of 
stimuli.
Some researchers identify the many available computer models as being overly simplistic 
or too focused on a single phenomenon.  Fridman and Kaminka (2007) applied Festinger’s 
(1954) social comparison theory, which generalizes across social phenomena, to a model for 
crowd behavior with the expressed purpose of addressing this problem.  The basic principle of 
the model is that when humans are unable to objectively determine their internal state, they will 
turn to similar members and evaluate their behavior via comparison, i.e. imitation. The supposed 
prevalence of such behavior strengthens the model's generality.  The model demonstrates many 
natural behaviors similar to real-world human crowd behavior.
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Continuing with perceived narrow focus as a recurring weakness in existing models, 
Fridman and Kaminka (2009) developed another general cognitive crowd model based on social 
comparison theory as well as a method for evaluating the model’s behavior.  The model uses a 
“contagion” algorithm to simulate social comparison behavior and was developed using the Soar 
cognitive architecture combined with the GameBots virtual environment.  This environment 
provided a dynamic, 3D world for the agents to move in.  The method for evaluation consisted of 
questionnaires given to humans observing the model simulation, with question format 
resembling “Were any agents working together?” and “Were there any leaders?”.  The gathered 
data suggests that the computer model matches many characteristics observed in a real-world 
scenario.
Guy et al. (2010) proposed a new algorithm called “PLEdestrians” for simulating large 
heterogeneous crowds.  The goal of this particular simulation was to achieve interactive rates 
using the Principle of Least Effort; hence the “PLE”.  A desktop PC could simulate crowds 
consisting of thousands of agents.  Using PLEdestrians, each agent in the crowd calculates a 
trajectory that is energy efficient and avoids collisions.  The model exhibits emergent phenomena 
observed in real-world crowds: lane formation, crowd compression, and edge and wake effects. 
Results were compared with previous studies and real-world video of crowds.  Both quantitative 
performance analysis and qualitative comparisons to the video data showed promising results. 
Limitations to the model include an over-simplified means of calculating energy efficiency based 
on walking in a straight line.  Also, the human representation is a simplified rigid disc instead of 
the relatively pliable shape humans actually are.
In a similar effort to improve simulation runtime, Guy, Lin, and Manocha (2010) 
proposed a new trajectory planning algorithm simulating human movement, called RCAP 
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(Reciprocal Collision Avoidance for Pedestrians).  The algorithm assumes implicit cooperation 
among agents, resulting in a sharing of the collision avoidance workload.  Based on a provably 
sound algorithm for simulating robots, it adds a “human touch” by incorporating human traits to 
better simulate human collision avoidance, e.g. adding personal space, delayed response times, 
etc.  The model was evaluated against human walking data.  In terms of path similarity, real-
world data fit well with the simulated data, and the improvements added negligible computation 
time over the original algorithm.  In terms of collision response, the model was observed to 
match a similar human response pattern of observe and react, followed by a maintenance phase.
Pelechano et al. (2007) faced the problem of simulating both the crowd's local motion 
and global wayfinding behavior in a dynamically changing environment.  Their attempt to 
realistically and naturally simulate the above motion while maintaining a high crowd density 
required the combination of psychological and physiological rules into a social forces model. 
The resulting model is heterogeneous with different traits distributed among the agents.  Over 
long distances, “tangential” forces steer the agents, while over short distances, motion is 
achieved through collision avoidance and pushing due to conflicts in personal space tolerances.
Balancing local motion and global navigation is a common problem.  In another 
approach, a precomputed roadmap of the static environment is used for global wayfinding on the 
macroscopic level (Van den Berg, Patil, Sewall, Manocha, & Lin, 2008).  The model has built-in 
safeguards against unnatural oscillatory behaviors, and individual agents have local runtime 
planning and collision avoidance but do not coordinate with each other, instead performing their 
own calculations.  Agents do not repel each other.  Rather, they focus only on collision avoidance 
and reaching the desired destination. Van den Berg et al. credited this property with generating 
realistic emergent behaviors.  They applied the model to three scenarios: a stadium, an office 
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evacuation, and city crosswalks.  Natural behaviors were observed, including lane formation. 
The model’s strengths and weaknesses were credited to its simplicity: speedy computation at the 
cost of no rules of thumb and some unnatural behaviors demonstrated in specific circumstances. 
Performance evaluations showed that the distributed model scaled nearly linearly.
The above crowd models have all attempted to simulate crowds in a generic context.  The 
next two research projects, however, apply crowd modeling to more specific domains.  The first 
was by Sarmady, Haron, and Talib (2007).  They used a multi-agent model to simulate the 
crowds of the Tawaf area, which becomes extremely crowded during the Hajj season.  While 
more detailed human behavior models were available, they ultimately opted to incorporate a 
simpler one due to the need to simulate tens of thousands of individuals.  As a result, instead of a 
a more complex social forces model (which is considered for use in future studies), a cellular 
automata model is used for microscopic movement.  Individuals are given parameters and 
intentions which map to a series of actions, which in turn map to a series of macroscopic 
movements.  Static path tables are used for macroscopic behaviors so that a circular movement 
around the simulated Kaaba is maintained.  It is hoped that this continued research will produce a 
better understanding of this social phenomenon and increase the safety of the Kaaba's millions of 
annual pilgrims.
In addition to situations of extreme crowding like the example above, it has been 
observed that drunkenness mixed with crowds can also lead to injury.  Moore, Flajslik, Rosin, 
and Marshall (2008) investigated the causes of violence in intoxicated crowds by building a 
model that could help answer the how and why intoxication increases aggressive behavior.  They 
argued that intoxication disrupts social behaviors, and by disrupting social behaviors, emergent 
affiliative behaviors that would minimize stress are also disrupted.  Therefore, intoxication leads 
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to increased stress in crowded environments, and increased stress leads to aggression and 
violence.  The above ideas were incorporated into a particle model of human behavior, 
representing intoxication by destabilizing particle trajectories.  When simulating the model, two 
groups were placed on opposite ends of a narrow hallway, and each particle was given a point at 
the opposite end of the hallway to walk towards.  In “sober” trials, the model displayed emergent 
lane-forming behavior.  In “intoxicated” trials, lane formation was disrupted and velocities 
towards goals were reduced.  However, the model is based on data obtained from real-world 
sober crowds only, and Moore et al. argued that better data was needed based on real-world 
intoxicated crowds.
In some situations, it is useful to effect change within the crowd by applying external 
forces.  Kirkland and Maciejewski (2003) used the social force model to simulate pedestrian 
flow and human crowds.  They introduced into the simulation autonomous robots to directly 
influence the behavior of the crowds, encouraging lane formation, while discouraging chaos and 
traffic jams.  These robots, attracted by the crowds of people, attempt to influence behavior by 
moving at a velocity different from the surrounding people and by using auditory and visual 
cues.  Though their work was very preliminary, Kirkland and Maciejewski showed that 
introducing a heterogeneous element like a robot can alter the dynamics of a situation.  Their 
next goal became to deploy a robot that could create an attractive social force.
A similar project proposed a method for directing virtual crowds using navigation fields 
(Patil, Van den Berg, Curtis, Lin, & Manocha, 2010).  This method uses a social force model to 
handle local collision avoidance.  Agents are directed by user-defined guidance fields, even at 
interactive rates, while still retaining individual goals.  Guidance fields can also be obtained from 
video data of real-world crowds.  Regardless of how they are created, these fields are then 
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unified into a smooth navigation field.  The transition from guidance field to navigation field 
eases manipulation of the navigation field while still maintaining precision.  While the 
combination of interactivity and real-time feedback allows users to more effectively control 
crowd behavior, the model may not be capable of exhibiting certain macroscopic crowd 
behaviors.
Another possible application of human-computer interaction involves the populating of 
virtual spaces with simulated crowds.  Gayle and Manocha (2008) observed a problem in 
sparsely populated virtual worlds such as Second Life, which reduces immersion of human 
players and creates an undesired sense of lifelessness.  They developed techniques to populate 
the world with agents capable of autonomously avoiding collisions while navigating virtual 
paths, leading groups, and sometimes participating in a group.  Their approach is based on a 
centralized server network topology where each agent is connected to the server (or a group of 
servers with a shared database).  Agents possess local and global navigation models: the local 
model is based on social forces with the workload placed on client machines, and the global 
model is based on cell decomposition with the workload handled by server.  Up to 18 agents 
were simulated (the maximum number of available Second Life accounts), and real-time 
interactive performance was achieved.  Bandwidth posed a limiting factor, but it was estimated 
that one client could support 8-15 agents and still maintain desired performance.
Rather than use virtual crowds to serve human participants, sometimes human 
participants are used to further virtual crowd research.  A lack in commonly accepted validation 
methods for crowd simulation models has been observed (Pelechano, Stocker, Allbeck, & Badler, 
(2008).  Pelechano et al. proposed “a level of presence achieved by a human in a virtual 
environment”, i.e. immersion, as a metric for virtual crowd behavior.  Four different types of 
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models were implemented for human participants to interact with – social forces, rules based, 
cellular automata, and HiDAC (Pelechano et al., 2007) – and were evaluated for qualities that 
could harm presence in a virtual environment: shaking, discrete movement, overlapping with 
other agents, no communication between agents, agents unable to push each other, etc.  The 
researchers then created a virtual cocktail party, adding to the agents communication, 
locomotion, and idling animations.  Human participants were then inserted into the party using a 
head-mounted display, tracking sensors, etc.  Participants performed simple tasks in the virtual 
environment and then filled out a questionnaire rating the achieved presence of the different 
models.  Using the data gathered from the questionnaires and other sources, they were able to 
determine many positive qualities of the simulations, such as predictable human reactions to 
virtual crowd behaviors, as well as areas for improvement, such as improved auditory and haptic 
feedback.
Many of the previous studies described above have largely modeled crowds on a 
microscopic level where individual behaviors are simulated in detail.  The following studies 
simplify individual behavior to varying degrees in favor of a greater macroscopic perspective. 
Musse and Thalmann (1997) explored the relationship between a crowd of autonomous virtual 
humans and their emergent behavior, where group behavior was defined by a user, but individual 
behavior was determined by a random process.  The model also incorporates sociological 
concepts to represent certain behaviors.
In future work, Musse and Thalmann (2001) addressed the problems of how to model 
crowds using a hierarchical structure, how to distribute that structure, and how to account for 
behaviors of different complexities.  In approaching these problems, crowds were treated as 
hierarchies.  Three courses of action were made available to agents in these crowds: they could 
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follow their script (i.e. “programmed behavior”), react to events (i.e. “reactive or autonomous 
behavior”), or be directed by a user (i.e. “guided behavior”).  The resulting model was called the 
ViCrowd model.  Based on a flocking system, it uses a group-based as opposed to an individual-
based approach, resulting in improved performance.
Treuille et al. (2006) developed a crowd model based on continuum dynamics using 
dynamic potential fields and velocity fields for navigating among moving obstacles.  The focus 
was on large groups with common goals.  As such, the simulation is not agent-based. Instead, it 
uses per-particle energy minimization with a continuum perspective.  The resulting model may 
not be as general, but it does require less computational power.
Reducing a model's demands for computer cycles is especially important for models that 
are best simulated at interactive rates.  Narain, Golas, Curtis, and Lin (2009) wanted to do just 
that with a model of very large crowds.  This model represents crowds simultaneously as discrete 
individuals and as a single continuous system.  The latter systems takes the form of a continuum 
fluid, complete with density and flow velocity.  Narain et al. introduced the concept of the 
“unilateral incompressibility constraint” (UIC) to the large-scale continuous system, which 
constrains fluid movement by incorporating local collision avoidance.  The UIC speeds up the 
simulation by serving as a large-scale collision avoidance step.  The model was found to 
efficiently handle hundreds of thousands of agents; it could even simulate one million agents at 3 
frames per second.  Limitations include only local/adjacent collision avoidance, and proposed 
improvements included the use of social rules for more realistic behaviors.
The above study divided the crowd into two levels and simulated both simultaneously.  In 
this next study, a similar approach was taken with three levels.  Ivancevic, Reid, and Aidman 
(2010) proposed a new model of crowd behavior dynamics that incorporates entropic 
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geometrical principles with the goal of improving the predictive theory of crowd behavior.  The 
model operates on three “synergetic” levels – macro, meso, and micro – and attempts to explain 
crowd behaviors and behavior transitions by measuring these three levels simultaneously.  The 
macro level involves individual behavior dynamics which is then generalized for behavioral-
compositional crowd dynamics using a micro-level formalism.  The meso level in between these 
two consists of aggregate statistical-field dynamics.  Crowd dynamics were formulated as 
entropy in three steps: as individual behavior, as a non-equilibrium transition phase where the 
micro-level brings changes to the macro-level, and then as collective behavior.  Future work 
looked to add 3D simulations to bring the model a visual representation and also to study abrupt 
changes in crowd behavior.
One of the most practical benefits of crowd research is the better understanding and 
planning of human evacuations.  When disaster strikes, people typically flee the danger zone as 
quickly as possible.  Problems arise at choke points, where exits leading away from danger 
become clogged with humans.  Since improving evacuation rates has a direct impact on saving 
lives, it makes for a popular research topic.  Kamkarian (2009) used a multi-agent system to 
model crowds trapped in indoor spaces.  The model is inspired by swarm behavior and grid 
communications, applying a least effort algorithm to the agents.  Agents move toward the exit as 
fast as possible and in as straight a line as possible.  The model was used to measure evacuation 
rates in different scenarios where the placement of the exit changed.
In a study of communication's effect on evacuation rates, Pelechano and Badler (2006) 
developed “Maces”: the Multi-Agent Communication for Evacuation Simulation.  Maces' focus 
is on unknown environments; agents must explore and share discoveries with each other. 
Exploration involves wayfinding, a cognitive factor of navigation which involves four 
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components: a cognitive map for remembering the environment, an orientation to position 
oneself within the map, the ability to explore and learn the environment, and navigational ability. 
Maces uses local motion driven by Helbing's model (Helbing, Farkas, & Vicsek, 2000) and inter-
agent communication, which improved evacuation rates.
In emergency evacuations, each individual has a desired velocity but is often unable to 
attain that velocity due to congestion.  Maury, Roudneff-Chupin, and Santambrogio (2010) 
interpreted these qualities as the incompressibility constraints of a fluid.  Where a micro-level 
approach would treat individuals as rigid discs, their model uses a macro-level approach, instead 
being concerned with density, gradient structure, and gradient flow.  Since it takes a macro-level 
view of the crowd, the model is unable to trace the paths taken by individuals. Therefore, 
individual strategies, such as avoiding congested areas, can not be directly incorporated into the 
model.  However, the macroscopic approach produces natural motion where no movement would 
exist in a microscopic model.
Gawronski and Kulakowski (2011) investigated virtual human crowds attempting to 
leave a room through a small exit.  They simulated this problem using the generalized force 
model and the model parameters of Helbing et al. (2000), determining that the probability of 
trying to exit the simulated room was 10 percent, given 150 people.  This suggested that in 
crowds of hundreds, the individual’s mind has little power over moving its body to a desirable 
location; numerous other forces overwhelm the individual's control.  To raise the probability 
above 50 percent required the addition of a number of helping forces, but determining the 
number of helpers was made difficult due to the problem’s complexity.
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CHAPTER 4
THE MODELS
Presented in this section are three models representing three broadly defined scenarios. 
These scenarios are common in natural settings and can be generalized to include many other 
examples of crowds.  Each model emphasizes one of the three components in the behavioral 
intention formula.  These three components may be ordered in terms of increasing social scope: 
attitude from endogenous sources, influence to the relationships between individuals, and social 
norms to the relationships between individual and society.  The first model emphasizes 
attitudinal forces when simulating an exhibition floor.  The second model emphasizes influential 
forces during an evacuation.  The third model takes a closer look at the role of different types of 
norms in the formation of seating arrangements.  No single model is used to represent all three 
scenarios because the relative importance of any one component and the relationships between 
the components vary by scenario (Ajzen, 1991).
These models are inspired by the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1981), 
where intentions lead to behaviors.  Behavioral intention may be interpreted as the sum of 
products (Conner & Sparks, 2005) of weighted attitudes and subjective norms (Muduganti et al., 
2005).  This existing model can be extended by adding components (Robinson et al., 2008), 
resulting in Equation 2.  Further augmentation may take the form of thresholds, which form an 
important part of the decision-making process (Granovetter, 1978; Muduganti et al., 2005), and a 
greedy approach can be used for choosing among alternatives (Sheppard et al., 1988).
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Equation 2. The Modified Behavioral Intention Model. Based on Equation 1, behavioral 
intention is represented as a weighted sum of attributes of increasing scope.
The above ideas were adapted to models implemented in NetLogo, an environment for 
modeling multi-agent systems (Wilensky, 2010).  NetLogo provides a simple editor and an easy 
to use programming language where agents and a virtual environmental can be quickly defined 
and simulated.  The editor is just one tab within a larger NetLogo program.  Another tab contains 
a graphical representation of the virtual environment as well as buttons, controls, and displays 
that the user may define.  No compilation is required; the user may alter code in one tab and can 
view the effects immediately in the other.
The user interfaces and complete source code for the following three models may be 
found in the appendices.
The Museum
The setting of the first model is a museum exhibition floor, but a grocery store, hotel 
lobby, strip mall, or amusement park also serve as appropriate metaphors.  What all these settings 
have in common is an open floor on which pedestrians amble from one location to another. 
Static points of interest are spread across the floor, and overcrowding is typically not a concern. 
Keeping with the museum setting, agents represent museum attendees, and the points of interest 
represent the various artifacts which compose the exhibition.
This setting provides a conduit for chiefly observing attitude's effects on behavior by 
decreasing the importance of influence and social norms while simultaneously increasing the 
importance of attitudes.  Influence's prominence is diminished by the typical calm, open 
atmosphere.  The physically open space reduces the physical influence nearby agents may exert 
Behavioral intention=Weight Attitude∗AttitudeWeight Influence∗Influence
WeightSocial Norms∗Social NormsError
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on each other, and since each agent attends the exhibition on their own, cognitive influences are 
reduced as well by limiting an agent's social network.
The effect of social norms are diminished to different degrees depending on the norm.  As 
a social setting, museums inherently include a host of general rules.  For example, attendees are 
expected to respect the personal space of others, nor should they yell, harass, or steal; these are 
virtually universal norms.  More specific to the museum scenario, attendees understand that they 
should not touch the exhibits.  A real world museum's policy could include many additional 
norms, but they are beyond the scope of this more general model.  Most importantly, by entering 
the museum each attendee is assumed to be a willing participant and as such willingly follows 
the social contract.
The above diminishing effects leave attitude as the greatest contributing factor to an 
attendee's behavior.  The museum becomes the backdrop in which a visitor's movement is largely 
independent of external forces, instead determined by internal, endogenous attitude.  The 
attendee enters through a single entrance, wanders the show floor, and eventually leaves through 
the exit.  As they wander, attendees perceive various portions of the exhibition and make internal 
evaluations of each exhibit's compatibility with themselves.
For attitudes to function as a better predictor of behavior, general attitudes must predict 
general behaviors and specific attitudes must predict specific behaviors (Ajzen, 1991; Conner & 
Sparks, 2005).  Since the museum scenario is believed to be a situation that stresses attitudes, the 
attitude portion of the model is further divided into three subtypes – affective, conative, and 
cognitive (Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005) – as shown in Equation 3.
Equation 3. Dividing Attitude into Components for Greater Specificity.
Attitude=AttitudeAffective+AttitudeConative+AttitudeCognitive
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These attitude components are used to evaluate the attractiveness of each exhibit in the 
museum.  The affective factor represents an appreciation for a piece’s appeals to emotion.  The 
conative factor represents a willingness to react physically, and the cognitive factor represents an 
appreciation for appeals to logic.  In the simulation, each of the attendee's attitude components 
ranges from 1 to 7 and is randomly generated over a normal distribution with a mean of 4 and a 
standard deviation of 1.  A random floating point number ranging from 0 to 1 is used as an 
attitude weight.  Each museum exhibit also possesses corresponding values of appeal.  These 
values are assigned as random floating point numbers ranging from 1 to 7.  The distance between 
the attendee’s attitudes and an exhibit’s appeal represents compatibility between the two entities, 
as shown in Equation 4.  Because the affective, conative, and cognitive factors are approximated 
via equal weighting, the resulting differences are averaged together.
Equation 4. Calculating Compatibility Between Exhibit and Attendee. a is the attendee, e is the 
exhibit, and AAff, ACon, and ACog are the respective attitude components of affective, conative, and 
cognitive.
Despite their reduced roles, the museum attendee is still affected by influential and 
normative factors.  Influence is represented by pliancy, an attraction to exhibits that attendees 
nearest the target attendee express interest in.  Social norms are represented by crowd affinity, the 
willingness of the target attendee to view exhibits that have attracted a large number of viewers. 
These variables are generated using the same method as the attitude terms.
Agents are given age and energy parameters that limit their time spent at the museum. 
Energy values decay over time; the rate of decay decreases if visited exhibits are more 
compatible with the agent.  Age represents duration of agent activity, starts at 0, and simply 
Compatibility=∣(a.AAff −e.AAff )∣+∣(a.ACon−e.ACon)∣+∣(a.ACog−e.ACog)∣
3
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increments for every tick the agent exists in the simulation.  Attendees also have an attention 
span which determines how long they will focus on a target exhibit.  When that focus is broken 
by a randomized process, the attendee targets a new exhibit, maintaining a list of unexplored 
exhibits to choose from next.
The simulation begins with a fixed number of exhibits placed in a circular configuration 
and a single attendee at the entrance.  Whenever the current population is less than the maximum 
population cap (designated as num-attendees), an additional attendee is created every tick in the 
upper right corner of the virtual space.  Upon creation, aside from their randomly determined 
parameters as described above, the attendee also selects the nearest exhibit as the initial target. 
Therefore, the simulation begins devoid of attendee agents, but after a short amount of time has 
elapsed, a large population of agents exists to amble about the exhibition floor.
Figure 2 shows an example execution of the museum simulation.  The green upper right 
and red lower left squares represent the entrance and exit, respectively, to the virtual 
environment.  Pentagons represent individual exhibits, while circles represent the attendees. 
Attitude values are represented by a color's brightness – the brighter the color, the greater the 
value.  Which attitudinal component is displayed may be manipulated by a drop-down menu in 
the simulation's user interface.  In Figure 2, attendee cognitive parameters are displayed in 
magenta and exhibits' cognitive appeal values are in cyan.
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Figure 2. Commencing the Museum Simulation. Circular attendees visit pentagonal exhibits; 
brightness represents cognitive parameters.
The passage of time during the simulation is measured in ticks.  During each tick, each 
agent undergoes a decision-making process that determines their next action.  The first phase of 
this process involves updating their list of unvisited exhibits.  If their current location is also the 
location of an exhibit, that exhibit is removed from the list.  The second phase is the motion 
phase in which a target exhibit is chosen and pursued.  The attendee starts by checking their 
energy.  If their energy level is less than or equal to zero, they make their way towards the exit. 
Otherwise, the attendee makes a check against their attention span parameter.  The smaller their 
attention span, the greater chance the attendee has of switching to another target exhibit. 
Whether they change targets or not, the attendee then walks towards their exhibit of choice.  In 
the third and final phase, agents increment their age value and decrease their energy.  Energy 
decay is determined by a simple distance function comparing the attendee and the nearest 
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exhibit.  Exhibits with values closely resembling the corresponding values of the attendee results 
in slower energy decay.
Behavioral intention expresses itself during the second phase, specifically when choosing 
a new target exhibit.  The process of choosing an exhibit is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. The Attendee Process for Choosing a Target Exhibit. wA is the attitude weight, t is the 
attendee’s target exhibit, and I is the influence component of pliancy.
First, the attendee makes a check against their attitude weight.  The greater the weight’s 
value, the better chance that attitudes will be used in making a decision.  If the check succeeds, 
the target becomes the exhibit in the unvisited list that is most compatible with the attendee.  If 
the check fails, either influence or normative parameters are used to make the decision.  Given a 
successful check against an attendee's pliancy, the attendee will choose the same target as the 
nearest other attendee (Figure 3, line 6).  If this target has already been visited, however, the 
attitude method becomes the fallback option.  Otherwise, social norms are used, and the attendee 
targets the exhibit with the most nearby attendees, i.e. the most crowded exhibit (Figure 3, line 
11).  This process is summarized in the state diagram of Figure 4.  Using the above steps, 
behavioral intention becomes a process in which each attendee forms an intention about where 
they would like to go next within the virtual environment.  This intention may not result in 
1. If rand(0, 1) < wA
2.      t = mostCompatibleExhibit()
3. Elseif rand(1, 7) < I
4.      If targetOf(nearestNeighbor) ϵ
5.           unexploredList
6.           t = targetOf(nearestNeighbor)
7.      Else
8.           t = mostCompatibleExhibit()
9.      Endif
10. Else
11.      t = mostCrowdedExhibit()
12. Endif
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committed action, however, due to the overriding compulsion to leave the environment once 
energy levels are depleted.
Figure 4. The Attendee's Decision-making Process. Random checks compared to weights 
determine how the decision is made.
This model demonstrates the importance of location when placing points of interest. 
Exhibits that appeal to the most people should be readily accessible in order to retain people’s 
attention and prolong visits.  Perhaps room planners want to direct viewers along certain paths; 
they would need to consider each exhibit’s appeal to different types of people.  Figure 5 plots the 
fluctuating average age of attendees during the exhibition.  Increasing trends represent periods 
where attendees are viewing the exhibits, while decreasing trends represent periods where 
attendees are leaving and new attendees are being created.  New attendees have age 0 and 
therefore lower the average age in the graph.  This information could be used to predict and 
control flow between an entrance and an exit via placement of points of interest.  Producing 
periodic fluctuations in average age indicates attendees entering and leaving in groups.  Very 
little fluctuation indicates a more regular flow of individuals.
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Figure 5. Museum Attendee Average Age over Time.
The Station Platform
The second model represents a station platform, which may be found near a train, bus, or 
subway depot.  The station platform is included as a common crowd scenario to represent areas 
of high density, where people push and shove as they try to reach a common Point Of Interest 
(POI), e.g. a train’s open door, an entry gate, or an exit gate.  A second dynamic arises in this 
scenario with the addition of a negative POI, which may represent a bomb or a threatening 
criminal.  The negative point creates alarm in people who perceive it, which spreads across the 
crowd and causes a change in priorities; people now desire to evacuate the premises.  This 
scenario strengthens the power of the influence component above attitude and social norms. 
Attitudes are largely the same across the crowd; they must reach the target destination.  Many 
social norms, especially those involving personal space, are weakened due to the limited 
availability of space.
In this model, influence takes two forms: physical influence and mental influence. 
Physical influence, what is termed physical enmity in the model, represents the force an agent is 
willing to exert on others to push them away.  This is inspired by the social force model (Helbing 
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and Molnar, 1995) where particles emit force fields that push and pull each other due to changes 
in motivation.  Mental influence, more specifically alarm acquisition in this model, represents 
how quickly an agent will acquire an alarmed status from others nearby.  The two forms of 
influence function as a compliance component that people use to increase the accuracy of their 
perceptions (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004).
If influence is the means of acquiring alarm from others, attitude is the means of creating 
alarm by reacting to a negative perception.  Even if they are not directly or indirectly alarmed by 
the negative POI, a passenger that witnesses everyone else leaving in the opposite direction is 
compelled by their follow affinity parameter to due likewise, representing a social norm of 
sensitivity to crowd motion.  Similar to the parameters in the museum model, each parameter 
ranges from 1 to 7 and is randomly generated over a normal distribution with a mean of 4 and a 
standard deviation of 1.  Also, each passenger’s alarm level is initiated to zero.
The virtual environment of the station platform consists of a square field divided in half 
by a barrier, impenetrable save for a single opening in its center.  A variable number of passenger 
agents are created south of the barrier.  When the simulation begins, each agent attempts to move 
towards the bottom center of the screen, representing some POI.  This motion is countered by the 
physical influence passengers exert on each other.
Physical influence is represented by directed edges connecting the agents.  Edges are 
created as a function of an agent’s physical enmity and a globally defined physical weight.  The 
two parameters form a product which forms the radius of a “circle of influence”.  The agent at 
the center creates a directed edge towards other agents that fall within this circle.  However, 
edges only connect agents that possess line of sight, i.e. edges do not intersect the central barrier. 
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A typical execution of the station platform simulation can be viewed in Figure 6, where 
passengers push each other and try to get closer to the bottom center of the environment.
Figure 6. A Simulated Crowd at a Station Platform. The barrier is represented by gray rectangles, 
passengers by white circles, and influences by directed edges.
With the initial environment, passengers, and influence edges created, each tick of the 
simulation then proceeds to model the motion of the passengers.  This process begins by first 
calculating each passenger’s basic trajectory, ignoring the influence network.  In this step, 
passengers are placed into one of three categories: “calm and not following”, “calm and 
following”, or alerted.  The categorization process is shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. The Passenger Process for Choosing a Destination. A is the attitude component of 
alarm creation, wN is the norm weight, N is the norm component of follow affinity, and t is the 
passenger’s target destination.
“Calm and not following” passengers, the default state, are those who move towards the 
bottom center of the environment (Figure 7, line 3).  “Calm and following” passengers have not 
been alerted either directly or indirectly but proceed to exit the bottom half of the environment 
regardless due to a social norm of “follow the herd”, i.e. everyone else is leaving for an unknown 
reason, so the passenger leaves too (Figure 7, line 5).  This behavior is triggered when a certain 
percentage of the total population leaves the area, exceeding the passenger’s follow affinity 
threshold.  The third category of passenger, alarmed passengers, also make their way to the exit 
(Figure 7, line 8).  Alarmed passengers use their alarm creation parameter as a threshold that 
their current alarm level must exceed.  This parameter also represents the level of alarm a 
passenger assumes when directly perceiving a negative POI.  Once categorized, passengers move 
towards their appropriate destination.  Figure 8 represents this decision process as a state 
diagram.
1. If alarmLevel < A
2.      If wN * N < unevacuatedPopulation
3.           t = bottomCenter
4.      Else
5.           t = top
6.      Endif
7. Else
8.      t = top
9. Endif
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Figure 8. The Passenger's Decision-making Process. Attitudes and social norms form intentions 
after thresholds are exceeded.
A maintenance phase follows after the move step in which the influence network is 
updated.  New edges are created between agents (between passengers or a negative POI) using 
the process described earlier, and old edges that connect agents too far apart are destroyed.
With the network updated, the next step uses this network to communicate alarm between 
passengers and exert influence on the motion of the passengers.  The process of alarm creation 
and transmission is shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9. The Passenger Process for Creating and Spreading Alarm. wA is the attitude weight, A is 
the attitude component of alarm creation, alarmp is the perceived alarm, N is the set of neighbors, 
wIM is is the mental influence weight, and IM is the mental influence.
Alarm is initially created by passengers with a direct connection to a negative POI and is 
the product of a passenger’s alarm creation parameter multiplied by a global attitude weight 
(Figure 9, line 3).  Alarm may also be acquired from neighboring passengers.  Each passenger 
takes the average alarm level of its neighbors, compares the resulting mean value to its current 
1. If isNeighbor(offender)
2.      If alarmLevel < wA * A
3.           alarmLevel = wA * A
4.      Endif
5. Else
6.      alarmp = mean(N1.alarmLevel,
7.                    N2.alarmLevel,
8.                    ... ,
9.                    Nn.alarmLevel)
10.      alarmLevel += (alarmp – alarmLevel)
11.                    * wIM * IM
12. Endif
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alarm level, and adjusts up or down accordingly (Figure 9, lines 10-11).  The result is a source of 
alarm propagating across a network, represented in Figure 10 as different shades of red.  After 
calculating mental influence, physical influence is represented by a repulsive force exerted by the 
network connections.  The force algorithm used is built into NetLogo and is similar to 
Fruchterman and Reingold’s (1991) layout algorithm.  The algorithm imbues edges with a 
spring-like elasticity and results in passengers moving themselves out of the way of others in 
order to satisfy their personal space requirements, the NetLogo procedure for which is shown in 
Equation 5.
Figure 10. Alarm Propagating Across the Crowd. Alarm is represented by shades of red. The 
target symbol represents a negative POI.
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Equation 5. Creating Passenger-passenger Repulsion. {p, N} is the set of a passenger and its 
neighbors, eO is the set of outward edges, 0.1 is the force exerted along the edges, wIP is the 
physical influence weight, IP is the physical influence, and 0 is the global passenger repulsion. A 
more detailed explanation of the layout-spring procedure may be found in the online NetLogo 
Dictionary.
In the station platform model, a passenger’s attitude towards the negative POI, mental 
influence of neighbors, and social norms forms an intention that involves reaching either the 
bottom or top of the environment.  However, physical influences often overpower these 
intentions due to other passengers sharing similar goals in a crowded space.  Figure 11 shows a 
typical execution of the simulation which demonstrates these concepts.  Passengers which were 
originally determined to reach the bottom center of the screen are alarmed either directly by the 
negative POI or indirectly by nearby passengers.  When their alarm level exceeds a threshold, 
shown in deeper shades of red, they attempt to leave the bottom half of the environment.  As 
more and more passengers similarly attempt to leave, physical crowding causes bottlenecking at 
the single exit.
layout−spring ({p ,N } ,eO ,0.1, w IP∗I P ,0)
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Figure 11. A Station Platform Crowd in Mid-evacuation.
This scenario demonstrates some interesting crowd behavior.  First, the crowd 
phenomenon of congestion around an exit is readily observed.  This congestion may be attributed 
to the interfering forces passengers apply to each other.  The size of the exit may be adjusted 
during the simulation, and wider gaps allow for decreased evacuation times.  However, the gap 
in the barrier also exposes some problems with this particular simulation specifically dealing 
with corners.  Certain collision detection problems results in a vibrating pattern of motion with 
passengers.  While this does not cause agents to become stuck, the motion is unrealistic and 
should be eliminated in future work.  Other interesting behaviors concern the transmission of 
alarm over the network.  If passengers nearest the negative POI possess particularly low alarm 
creation parameters, they fail to propagate enough alarm in others to cause a change in behavior. 
Similarly, if passengers are alarmed but possess high physical enmity values, they avoid others 
and fail to transmit the alarm.  By avoiding others, passengers may also fail to properly acquire 
alarm.
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These observations lead to possible applications for the model.  The concept of alarm 
transmission can be expanded into a more general form or made more specific to another domain 
in order to further study information diffusion across a network of people.  While the station 
platform model resembles an evacuation, it does not simulate evacuation behaviors specifically. 
However, the model and virtual environment could be tailored to better predict evacuation 
behavior, especially to investigate the importance of alerting participants that an evacuation is 
taking place.
The Classroom
The third scenario represents a school classroom, which shares some similarities with a 
seating problem or a resource allocation problem.  Students enter the classroom and one by one, 
they choose a seat.  Which seat they choose is a function of which seats are available and the 
interacting forces of personal and social preferences.  An attitude value represents the student’s 
personal feelings towards sitting near the front and center of the classroom, and an influence 
value takes into account the number of occupied seats adjacent to a candidate desk.  What this 
scenario seeks to focus on, however, is the power of social norms.
There are many different types of social norms (Schultz et al., 2007), and the subjective 
norm’s performance in predicting behavior may require expansion (Armitage & Conner, 2001). 
Therefore, different types of norms are incorporated into the student’s decision making process. 
In the classroom scenario, one social norm of particular strength is the expectation that people 
are to sit near the front and center.  Another norm is a norm of consistency, that once a person has 
chosen a seat, they are expected to choose the same seat the following day.  By incorporating 
pressures encouraging consistency, the classroom model attempts to address a perceived 
weakness in the original theory of reasoned action, which does not account for past behaviors.  If 
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this norm was absolute in its power, then the first day would determine the final seating 
arrangement, but this is rarely the case.  Instead, the strength of the norm interacts with students’ 
varying levels of norm adherence coupled with attitudinal and influential forces.
The simulation begins by creating a set of students.  Each student has their intention 
parameters initialized to values ranging from 1 to 7 and randomly generated over a normal 
distribution with a mean of 4 and a standard distribution of 1.  These students are positioned 
along the bottom of the virtual environment.  Above them are positioned a grid of desks.  During 
each tick of the simulation, one student is randomly chosen who picks a vacant desk to sit in. 
The desk selection process is shown in Figure 12.
Figure 12. The Student Process for Choosing a Desk. wN1 and N1 are the respective norm weight 
and norm of sitting towards the front and center of the classroom, wN2 and N2 are the respective 
norm weight and norm of sitting in seat used previously, and t is the student’s target desk.
The desk selection process consists of two checks.  The first check compares a random 
number to the product of the “sit near the front” norm and the student’s personal adherence to the 
norm.  If the check succeeds, then the student sits at the closest available seat to the front and 
center of the classroom (Figure 12, line 2).  If the students fail to adhere to the norm, then 
another similar check occurs using the “sit in the same seat” norm multiplied by the student’s 
adherence.  Successful adherence causes the student to sit in their previous seat (Figure 12, line 
5).  If the seat is unavailable or the student again fails to adhere to a norm, another selection 
process begins in which attitudes and influences are used to choose the desk (Figure 12, line 7). 
1. If rand(0, 100) < wN1 * N1
2.      t = mostFrontCenter(availableDesks)
3. Elseif rand(0, 100) < wN2 * N2
4.             AND previousDesk ϵ availableDesks
5.      t = previousDesk
6. Else
7.      t = mostCompatibleDesk()
8. Endif
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The overall decision process is summarized in the state diagram of Figure 13, and the attitude-
influence selection subprocess is shown in Figure 14.
Figure 13. The Student's Decision-making Process. If social norms are not used, attitudes and 
influences combine to take their place.
Figure 14. The Student Process for Determining the Most Compatible Desk. closestDesk is the 
desk closest to the front and center, furthestDesk is the desk furthest from the front and center, 
and d is the distance between the two. A is the attitude towards sitting near the front, and dpreferred 
is the transformation of that attitude into a distance. candidateDesks is the set of 3 desks with a 
distance from the front and center closest to dpreffered. t is the student’s target desk, the candidate 
desk with a crowding level closest to I, the influence exerted by neighboring occupied desks.
A student’s attitude parameter represents their personal feelings towards sitting near the 
front of the class.  This attitude is translated into a region of space pivoting around the closest 
front and center desk (Figure 14, line 2). Larger values form regions closer to the front and 
center, while smaller values form regions further away.  The three vacant desks closest to this 
region form a list of candidates (Figure 14, line 3), and a single desk is chosen from the list by 
comparing the number of occupied desks near each candidate to the student’s preference for 
crowding (Figure 14, line 4), e.g. if a student possesses a low tolerance for crowding, then the 
candidate desk with the least number of adjacent occupied desks will be selected.
1. d = distance(closestDesk, furthestDesk)
2. dpreferred = A * d
3. candidateDesks = closest3(desks, dpreffered)
4. t = closest(candidateDesks, I)
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The decision process repeats until all students are seated.  A resulting seating arrangement 
may be found in Figure 15 which shows 20 students seated after their second round of choosing 
desks.  Desks are represented by small, brown squares.  Students are represented by person-
shaped symbols and an identification number.  After choosing a desk, a color code indicates how 
the choice was made.  Purple follows the “sit in the same seat” norm, red follows the “sit nearest 
the front” norm, and blue indicates that a combination of attitude and influence factors were 
used.
Figure 15. A Classroom of Seated Students. Purple, red, and blue indicate “sit in the same seat” 
and “sit near the front” norms and using attitudes and influences, respectively.
The classroom model explores a couple scenario-specific norms and their interaction with 
attitudes, influences, and behavior.  Even when social norm strength was made very strong, 
however, individual moderate adherence diminished overall impact on behavior.  If attitude, 
influence, and social norms are evaluated by scope, then the social norms – the outermost “shell” 
– were likely too broad to generate the desired crowd behaviors on their own.  This model also 
62
attempted to improve a possible weakness of the theory of reasoned action by combining norms 
with knowledge of past behavior.  However, the model only accounts for the most recent desk 
choice and might be improved with an expanded memory of past actions.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, behavioral intention and attitude, influence, and social norm components 
were applied to three scenarios that represent common crowd dynamics: ambulation about an 
open hall, high density evacuation, and crowd resource allocation.  The result was three related 
models that explored different facets of crowd behavior by stressing the different components. 
Some properties of crowd behavior were simulated directly, while others emerged from the 
interaction between agents.  Phenomena of interest included oscillating population levels in the 
museum, weakened norm adherence in the classroom, congestion at the exit of the station 
platform, and the (lack of) propagation of alarm.
These phenomena showed that the intention components of attitude, influence, and social 
norms are applicable and flexible when simulating crowd behavior.  However, these components 
are best utilized within certain limits represented as expanding levels of scope.  The model was 
shown to be highly adaptable, though the ease of adaptation varied among the scenarios.  Certain 
successes found in one model – particularly the model of the station platform, which 
demonstrated some of the most promising displays of crowd behavior – could be adapted for use 
in the other models.
The flexibility demonstrated by the concepts underlying all three models also means that 
many future modifications can be made to either improve existing performance or to investigate 
new ideas.  For example, past behavior is also an important factor for predicting future behavior 
(Armitage, 2005), so future work could involve adding dynamic components to the agents where 
internal parameters are adjusted by perceptions of the environment.  Other work could involve 
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attempting to replicate additional emergent crowd behaviors, such as lane formation, using 
behavioral intention.
These models may be adapted for point of interest placement, information diffusion, or 
different types of social networks.  Ultimately, a better understanding of crowd behavior leads to 
better models of human behavior both in the crowd and as individuals, and that means improved 
evacuation planning, architecture design, etc. for anywhere humans gather.
65
REFERENCES
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision  
Processes, 50(2), 179-211.
Ajzen, I. (2005). Attitudes, personality, and behavior. New York, NY: Open University Press.
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (2005). The influence of attitudes on behavior. In D. Albarracin, B. T. 
Johnson, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), The handbook of attitudes (pp. 173-221). Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Ajzen, I., & Madden, T. J. (1986). Prediction of goal-directed behavior: Attitudes, intentions, and 
perceived behavioral control. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22(5), 453-
474.
Armitage, C. J., & Conner, M. (2001). Efficacy of the theory of planned behaviour: A meta-
analytic review. British Journal of Social Psychology, 40, 471-499.
Armitage, C. J. (2005). Can the theory of planned behavior predict the maintenance of physical 
activity? Health Psychology, 24(3), 235-245.
Berk, R. A. (1974). A gaming approach to crowd behavior. American Sociological Review, 39, 
355-373.
Bock, G.-W., Zmud, R. W., Kim, Y.-G., & Lee, J.-N. (2005). Behavioral intention formation in 
knowledge sharing: Examining the roles of extrinsic motivators, social-psychological 
forces, and organizational climate. MIS Quarterly, 29(1), 87-111.
Briano, E., & Revetria, R. (2008). A study of crowd behavior in emergency tunnel procedures. 
International Journal of Mathematics and Computers in Simulation, 2(4), 349-358.
Cho, K., Iketani, N., Kikuchi, M., Nishimura, K., Hayashi, H., & Hattori, M. (2008). BDI model-
based crowd simulation. In H. Prendinger, J. Lester, and M. Ishizuka (Eds.), 8th 
66
International Conference on Virtual Intelligent Agents (IVA 2008), 364-371.
Christou, A. (2010). Crowd cognition. Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses 
Database. (AAT 1477397)
Cialdini, R. B., & Goldstein, N. J. (2004). Social influence: Compliance and conformity. Annual  
Review of Psychology, 55, 591-621.
Cialdini, R. B., & Trost, M. R. (1998). Social influence: Social norms, conformity, and 
compliance. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social  
psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 151-192). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Colman, A. M. (1991). Crowd psychology in South African murder trials. American 
Psychologist, 46(10), 1071-1079.
Conner, M., & Sparks, P. (2005). Theory of planned behaviour and health behaviour. In M. 
Conner & P. Norman (Eds.), Predicting health behaviour: Research and practice with  
social cognition models (2nd ed., pp. 170-222). Maidenhead, Berkshire: Open University 
Press.
Couch, C. J. (1968). Collective behavior: An examination of some stereotypes. Social Problems,  
15(3), 310-322.
Crano, W. D., & Prislin, R. (2006). Attitudes and persuasion. Annual Review of Psychology, 57, 
345-374.
DePaulo, B. M., & Friedman, H. S. (1998). Nonverbal communication. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. 
Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 3 - 
40). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Elster, J. (1989). Social norms and economic theory. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,  
3(4), 99-117.
67
Fazio, R. H., & Towles-Schwen, T. (1999). The MODE model of attitude-behavior processes. In 
S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual-process theories in social psychology (pp. 97-116). 
New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004). Social norms and human cooperation. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 8(4), 185-190.
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140.
Fishbein, M. (1980). A theory of reasoned action: Some applications and implications. In H. E. 
Howe Jr. & M. M. Page (Eds.), Nebraska symposium on motivation (Vol. 27, pp. 65–
116). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1981). Attitudes and voting behaviour: An application of the theory of 
reasoned action. In G. M. Stephenson & J. M. Davis (Eds.), Progress in applied social  
psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 95-125). London: Wiley.
Fridman, N., & Kaminka, G. A. (2007). Towards a cognitive model of crowd behavior based on 
social comparison theory. Proceedings of the Twenty-Second National Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-07), 731-737.
Fridman, N., & Kaminka, G. A. (2009). Comparing human and synthetic group behaviors: A 
model based on social psychology. In A. Howes, D. Peebles, & R. Cooper (Eds.), 9th 
International Conference on Cognitive Modeling (ICCM2009). Manchester, UK.
Fruchterman, T. M. J., & Reingold, E. M. (1991). Graph drawing by force-directed placement. 
Software: Practice and Experience, 21(11), 1129-1164.
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional processes in 
evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. Psychological 
Bulletin, 132(5), 692-731.
68
Gawronski, P., & Kulakowski, K. (2011). Crowd dynamics - being stuck. Computer Physics  
Communications, 182(9), 1924-1927.
Gayle, R., & Manocha, D. (2008). Navigating virtual agents in online virtual worlds. 
Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on 3D Web Technology (Web3D '08), 
53-56.
Granovetter, M. (1978). Threshold models of collective behavior. American Journal of  
Sociology, 83(6), 1420-1443.
Guy, S. J., Chhugani, J., Curtis, S., Dubey, P., Lin, M. C., & Manocha, D. (2010). PLEdestrians: 
A least-effort approach to crowd simulation. Proceedings of the 2010 ACM 
SIGGRAPH/Eurographics Symposium on Computer Animation, 119-128.
Guy, S. J., Lin, M. C., & Manocha, D. (2010). Modeling collision avoidance behavior for virtual 
humans. International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 
(AAMAS), 2, 575-582.
Helbing, D., Farkas, I., & Vicsek, T. (2000). Simulating dynamical features of escape panic. 
Nature, 407(6803), 487-490.
Helbing, D., & Molnar, P. (1995). Social force model for pedestrian dynamics. Physical Review 
E, 51(5), 4282-4286.
Ivancevic, V. G., Reid, D. J., & Aidman, E. V. (2010). Crowd behavior dynamics: Entropic path-
integral model. Nonlinear dynamics, 59(2), 351-373.
Kahan, D. M. (1997). Social influence, social meaning, and deterrence. Virginia Law Review, 
83(2), 349-395.
Kamkarian, P. (2009). Crowd evacuation for indoor public spaces. Retrieved from ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses Database. (AAT 1469318)
69
Kandori, M. (1992). Social norms and community enforcement. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 59(1), 64-80.
Kirkland, J. A., & Maciejewski, A. A. (2003). A simulation of attempts to influence crowd 
dynamics. IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 4328-4333.
Lacks, R. D., Gordon, J. A., & McCue, C. M. (2005). Who, what, and when: A descriptive 
examination of crowd formation, crowd behavior, and participation with law enforcement 
at homicide scenes in one city. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 30(1), 1-20.
Le Bon, G. (1895). The crowd: A study of the popular mind. London: Ernest Benn.
Lee, S., & Son, Y.-J. (2008). Integrated human decision making model under belief-desire-
intention framework for crowd simulation. Proceedings of the 2008 Winter Simulation 
Conference, 886-894.
Maury, B., Roudneff-Chupin, A., & Santambrogio, F. (2010). A macroscopic crowd motion 
model of gradient flow type. Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences,  
20(10), 1787–1821.
Moore, S. C., Flajslik, M., Rosin, P. L., & Marshall, D. (2008). A particle model of crowd 
behavior: Exploring the relationship between alcohol, crowd dynamics and violence. 
Aggression and Violent Behavior, 13(6), 413-422.
Muduganti, R. R., Sogani, S. K., & Hexmoor, H. (2005). Comparison of information technology 
adoption rates across laggards, innovators and others. Proceedings of IEEE International  
Conference on Information Technology (ITCC 2005).
Musse, S. R., & Thalmann, D. (1997). A model of human crowd behavior: Group inter-
relationship and collision detection analysis. Computer Animation and Simulation ‘97, 
39-51.
70
Musse, S. R., & Thalmann, D. (2001). Hierarchical model for real time simulation of virtual 
human crowds. IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics, 7(2), 152-
164.
Narain, R., Golas, A., Curtis, S., & Lin, M. C. (2009). Aggregate dynamics for dense crowd 
simulation. ACM Transactions on Graphics - Proceedings of ACM SIGGRAPH Asia  
2009, 28(5), 122:1-122:8.
Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective action and the evolution of social norms. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 14(3), 137-158.
Patil, S., Van den Berg, J., Curtis, S., Lin, M. C., & Manocha, D. (2010). Directing crowd 
simulations using navigation fields. IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer  
Graphics, 17(2), 244-254.
Pelechano, N., Allbeck, J. M., & Badler, N. I. (2007). Controlling individual agents in high-
density crowd simulation. Proceedings of the 2007 ACM SIGGRAPH/Eurographics  
Symposium on Computer Animation, 99-108.
Pelechano, N., & Badler, N. I. (2006). Modeling crowd and trained leader behavior during 
building evacuation. IEEE Computer Graphics and Applications, 26(7), 80-86. 
Pelechano, N., Stocker, C., Allbeck, J., & Badler, N. (2008). Being a part of the crowd: Towards 
validating VR crowds using presence. Proceedings of 7th International Conference on 
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), 136-142.
Postmes, T., Spears, R., & Cihangir, S. (2001). Quality of decision making and group norms. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80(6), 918-930.
Reicher, S. D. (2001). The psychology of crowd dynamics. In M. A. Hogg & R. S. Tindale 
(Eds.), The Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group processes (pp. 182-208). 
71
Oxford, England: Blackwell.
Robinson, N. G., Masser, B. M., White, K. M., Hyde, M. K., & Terry, D. J. (2008). Predicting 
intentions to donate blood among non-donors in Australia: An extended theory of planned 
behavior. Transfusion, 48(12), 2559-2567.
Ryan, M. J. (1982). Behavioral intention formation: The interdependency of attitudinal and social 
influence variables. The Journal of Consumer Research, 9(3), 263-278.
Sarmady, S., Haron, F., & Talib, A. Z. H. (2007). Agent-based simulation of crowd at the Tawaf 
area. Proceedings of the National Seminar on Hajj Best Practices Through Advances in  
Science and Technology.
Schepers, J., & Wetzels, M. (2007). A meta-analysis of the technology acceptance model: 
Investigating subjective norm and moderation effects. Information & Management, 44, 
90-103.
Schultz, P. W., Nolan, J. M., Cialdini, R. B., Goldstein, N. J., & Griskevicius, V. (2007). The 
constructive, destructive, and reconstructive power of social norms. Psychological 
Science, 18(5), 429-434.
Sheppard, B. H., Hartwick, J., & Warshaw P. R. (1988). The theory of reasoned action: A meta-
analysis of past research with recommendations for modifications and future research. 
The Journal of Consumer Research, 15(3), 325-343.
Treuille, A., Cooper, S., & Popivic, Z. (2006). Continuum crowds. ACM Transactions on 
Graphics, 25(3), 1160-1168.
Van den Berg, J., Patil, S., Sewall, J., Manocha, D., & Lin, M. C. (2008). Interactive navigation 
of multiple agents in crowded environments. Proceedings of the 2008 Symposium on 
Interactive 3D Graphics and Games (I3D ‘08), 139-147.
72
Wilensky, U. (1999). NetLogo (Version 4.1.2) [Software]. Center for Connected Learning and 
Computer-Based Modeling, Northwestern University. Illinois: Evanston. Available from 
http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/
APPENDICES
73
APPENDIX A
USER INTERFACES
Some variables in NetLogo are neither declared nor initialized within the NetLogo code. 
These variables are declared and initialized from the NetLogo user interface.  Therefore, in 
addition to the source code made available in appendices B through D, reproductions of the 
NetLogo user interfaces, found on the following pages, are also necessary to run the simulations.
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Figure A1. The NetLogo User Interface for the Museum Model.
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Figure A2. The NetLogo User Interface for the Station Platform Model.
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Figure A3. The NetLogo User Interface for the Classroom Model.
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APPENDIX B
THE MUSEUM SOURCE CODE
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;; File: The Museum.nlogo
;; Author: Marcel Bouchard
;; Date: 19 July 2011
;;
;; The purpose of this model is to incorporate behavioral intention
;; concepts into an exhibition floor simulation, stressing attitude
;; components
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;; turtle breed: the exhibit
breed [exhibits exhibit]
exhibits-own [
  ;; each exhibit possesses three types of appeal
  affective-appeal  ;; emotional appeal
  conative-appeal   ;; behavioral appeal
  cognitive-appeal  ;; cognitive appeal
]
;; turtle breed: the attendee
breed [attendees attendee]
attendees-own [
  ;; the three factors that compose attitude
  affective-factor ;; appreciation for appeals to emotion
  conative-factor  ;; willingness / prone to react physically
  cognitive-factor ;; appreciation for appeals to thought
  attitude-weight
  ;; representations of influence and social norms
  pliancy        ;; attraction to exhibits targetted by nearest attendees
  crowd-affinity ;; attraction to exhibits with many nearby attendees
  ;; other simulation components
  age            ;; the number of ticks the agent has been alive
  energy         ;; overall willingness to remain at the exhibition
  attn-span      ;; likelihood to remain at an exhibit
  target-exhibit ;; current exhibit to travel towards
  unexplored     ;; the set of exhibits not yet visited
]
;; prepare the simulation
to setup
  clear-all
  setup-patches
  setup-turtles
  setup-colors
  display-labels
  do-plots
end
;; set all the patches to their default state
to setup-patches
  ask patches [
    set pcolor (brown - 3)
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    ;; paint the NE and SW corners to designate entrance and exit
    if (pxcor > max-pxcor - 2) and
      (pycor > max-pycor - 2) [set pcolor (green - 1)]
    if (pxcor < min-pxcor + 2) and
      (pycor < min-pycor + 2) [set pcolor (red - 1)]
  ]
end
;; set all the exhibits and attendees to their default state
to setup-turtles
  ;; first, set up the exhibits
  set-default-shape exhibits "pentagon"
  create-exhibits num-exhibits [
    set affective-appeal ((random-float 6) + 1)
    set conative-appeal ((random-float 6) + 1)
    set cognitive-appeal ((random-float 6) + 1)
  ]
  ;; arrangement depends on the chosen type from the drop-down menu
  if (exhibit-arrangement = "random") [
    ask exhibits [setxy random-xcor random-ycor]
  ]
  if (exhibit-arrangement = "circular") [
    layout-circle exhibits (max-pxcor * circle-size)
  ]
  ;; second, set up the first attendees
  set-default-shape attendees "circle"
  create-attendees 1
  ask attendees [
    setup-default-attendee
  ]
end
;; set default values for a given attendee
to setup-default-attendee
  set age 0
  ;; set position
  setxy max-pxcor max-pycor ;; move to north east corner
  set heading 180           ;; face south
  ;; set behavioral intention components
  set affective-factor (random-normal-1-7 4 1)
  set conative-factor (random-normal-1-7 4 1)
  set cognitive-factor (random-normal-1-7 4 1)
  set attitude-weight (random-float 1)
  set pliancy (random-normal-1-7 4 1)
  set crowd-affinity (random-normal-1-7 4 1)
  ;; set other variables
  set energy initial-energy
  set attn-span (random-float 1)
  ;; initially target closest exhibit
  set target-exhibit (min-one-of exhibits [distance myself])
  ;; initialize the set of unexplored exhibits to all exhibits
  set unexplored exhibits
end
;; produce a random number from 1 to 7 using a normal distribution
;; arg1 is the mean, arg2 the standard deviation
to-report random-normal-1-7 [arg1 arg2]
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  let number (random-normal arg1 arg2)
  if (number < 1) [set number 1]
  if (number > 7) [set number 7]
  report number
end
;; select the appropriate coloring scheme
to setup-colors
  if (color-mode = "affective") [
    ask exhibits [set color (scale-color green affective-appeal 1 7)]
    ask attendees [set color (scale-color violet affective-factor 1 7)]
  ]
  if (color-mode = "conative") [
    ask exhibits [set color (scale-color blue conative-appeal 1 7)]
    ask attendees [set color (scale-color orange conative-factor 1 7)]
  ]
  if (color-mode = "cognitive") [
    ask exhibits [set color (scale-color cyan cognitive-appeal 1 7)]
    ask attendees [set color (scale-color magenta cognitive-factor 1 7)]
  ]
end
;; draw indicator labels
to display-labels
  ask turtles [set label ""]
  if labels? [
    ask attendees [set label age]
    if (color-mode = "affective") [
      ask exhibits [set label (precision affective-appeal 2)]
    ]
    if (color-mode = "conative") [
      ask exhibits [set label (precision conative-appeal 2)]
    ]
    if (color-mode = "cognitive") [
      ask exhibits [set label (precision cognitive-appeal 2)]
    ]
  ]
end
;; draw various data to graphs
to do-plots
  set-current-plot "Average Age"
  set-current-plot-pen "age"
  if (any? attendees) [
    plot mean ([age] of attendees)
  ]
end
;; advance the entire simulation by one tick
to step
  ask attendees [
    update-exhibit-list
    move-attendee
    alter-energy
    set age (age + 1)
  ]
  equalize-attendance
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  exit-attendees
  setup-colors
  display-labels
  tick
  do-plots
end
;; remove explored exhibit from unexplored list
to update-exhibit-list
  if (any? exhibits-here) [
    ;; unexplored is updated to remove the exhibit at the attendee's
    ;; location
    let current-exhibit (one-of exhibits-here)
    set unexplored (unexplored with [who != [who] of current-exhibit])
  ]
end
;; move the attendee towards the appropriate destination
to move-attendee
  ifelse (energy > 0)
  [
    ;; possibly change targets
    if ((random-float 1) > attn-span) [
      change-target
    ]
    face target-exhibit
    ;; move toward target exhibit
    ifelse (distance target-exhibit < 1)
      [move-to target-exhibit]
      [forward 1]
  ]
  [
    ;; energy expired, so proceed to exit
    facexy min-pxcor min-pycor
    forward 1
  ]
end
;; choose the target exhibit depending on a variety
;; of internal and external forces
to change-target
  ifelse ((random-float 1) < attitude-weight)
    ;; using attitude
    [set target-exhibit (best-exhibit-for self unexplored)]
    [
      ifelse (((random-float 6) + 1) < pliancy)
        ;; using influence: attempt to let nearest neighbor pick target
        [
          let nearest-neighbor (min-one-of attendees [distance myself])
          let possible-target ([target-exhibit] of nearest-neighbor)
          ;; if target is not on unexplored list, revert to attitude
          ifelse (any? (unexplored with [who = [who] of possible-target]))
            [set target-exhibit possible-target]
            [set target-exhibit (best-exhibit-for self unexplored)]
        ]
        ;; using norms: target most crowded exhibit
        [
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          set target-exhibit (max-one-of exhibits [
            count (attendees with [(distance myself) < 2])
          ])
        ]
    ]
end
;; given an attendee and set of exhibits, report the most compatible exhibit
;; most compatible exhibit is the exhibit with most similar attributes
to-report best-exhibit-for [attnd exhibit-set]
  report min-one-of exhibit-set [(
    abs ([affective-appeal] of self - [affective-factor] of attnd) +
    abs ([conative-appeal] of self - [conative-factor] of attnd) +
    abs ([cognitive-appeal] of self - [cognitive-factor] of attnd)
    ) / 3
  ]
end
;; decay energy depending on attributes of nearest exhibit
to alter-energy
  ;; find nearest exhibit
  let nearest (min-one-of exhibits [distance myself])
  ;; energy decay is the mean of differences
  set energy (
    energy - (
      abs ([affective-appeal] of nearest - affective-factor) +
      abs ([conative-appeal] of nearest - conative-factor) +
      abs ([cognitive-appeal] of nearest - cognitive-factor)
    ) / 3
  )
end
;; create a new attendee if below maximum population
to equalize-attendance
  if (count attendees < num-attendees) [
    create-attendees 1 [
      setup-default-attendee
    ]
  ]
end
;; remove attendees at the exit
to exit-attendees
  ask attendees [
    if (pcolor = ([pcolor] of patch min-pxcor min-pycor)) [die]
  ]
end
;; advance simulation indefinitely
to go
  if ticks >= tick-limit [stop]
  step
end
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APPENDIX C
THE STATION PLATFORM SOURCE CODE
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;; File: The Station Platform.nlogo
;; Author: Marcel Bouchard
;; Date: 19 July 2011
;;
;; The purpose of this model is to incorporate behavioral intention
;; concepts into a station platform simulation, stressing influence
;; components
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;; turtle breed: the passenger
breed [passengers passenger]
passengers-own [
  ;; attitude: degree of reaction towards offender
  alarm-creation ;; also doubles as a threshold for fleeing
  ;; influences:
  physical-enmity   ;; physical
  alarm-acquisition ;; mental
  ;; social norm: join mass exodus
  follow-affinity
  ;; other variables
  alarm-level
]
;; link breed: passenger-to-passenger links
directed-link-breed [passenger-links passenger-link]
;; turtle breed: the offender
breed [offenders offender]
;; link breed: links with the offender
directed-link-breed [offender-links offender-link]
;; prepare the simulation
to setup
  clear-all
  setup-patches
  setup-passengers
end
;; set all the patches to their default state
to setup-patches
  ask patches [
    set pcolor black
    ;; divide the world in half with a barrier
    ifelse (gap-size = 0)
      ;; barrier with no gap
      [if (pycor = 0) [set pcolor grey]]
      ;; barrier with gap
      [if (pycor = 0)
        and ((pxcor < gap-size / -2)
          or (pxcor >= gap-size / 2)) [set pcolor grey]
      ]
  ]
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end
;; set all the passengers to their default state
to setup-passengers
  set-default-shape passengers "circle"
  ;; create passengers on unique patches
  create-passengers num-passengers [
    set color white
    ;; place passengers below the barrier
    set xcor random-xcor
    set ycor (random-float (min-pycor + 1)) - 1
    correct-position
    ;; set behavioral intention attributes
    set alarm-creation (random-normal-1-7 4 1)
    set physical-enmity (random-normal-1-7 4 1)
    set alarm-acquisition (random-normal-1-7 4 1)
    set follow-affinity (random-normal-1-7 4 1)
    set alarm-level 0
  ]
  setup-passenger-links
end
;; recursively place turtle below barrier in unique position
to correct-position
  if (any? (other turtles-here)) [
    set xcor random-xcor
    set ycor (random-float (min-pycor + 1)) - 1
    correct-position
  ]
end
;; produce a random number from 1 to 7 using a normal distribution
;; arg1 is the mean, arg2 the standard deviation
to-report random-normal-1-7 [arg1 arg2]
  let number (random-normal arg1 arg2)
  if (number < 1) [set number 1]
  if (number > 7) [set number 7]
  report number
end
;; build a network based on proximity and line of sight
to setup-passenger-links
  ask passengers [
    let weighted-enmity (physical-enmity * physical-weight)
    create-passenger-links-to (other passengers with
      [((distance myself) < weighted-enmity)     ;; establish distance
        and (has-line-of-sight? self myself)]) [ ;; establish LOS
      set color ([color] of end2)
    ]
  ]
end
;; report false if the line joining two turtles intersects a barrier
to-report has-line-of-sight? [turtle1 turtle2]
  ;; turtles in the same room automatically have LOS
  if ([ycor] of turtle1 > 0) = ([ycor] of turtle2 > 0) [
    report true
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  ]
  let x1 ([xcor] of turtle1)
  let y1 ([ycor] of turtle1)
  let x2 ([xcor] of turtle2)
  let y2 ([ycor] of turtle2)
  ;; calculate the x-intercept of the line between two turtles
  let x-intercept 0
  ifelse (x2 - x1 != 0)
    [
      let slope ((y2 - y1) / (x2 - x1))
      set x-intercept (round (-1 * y1 / slope + x1))
    ]
    [set x-intercept x1]
  ;; report false if x-intercept hits a barrier
  if (x-intercept < gap-size / -2) or (x-intercept >= gap-size / 2) [
    report false
  ]
  report true
end
;; advance the entire simulation by one tick
to step
  if (mouse-down?) [
    process-mouse
  ]
  setup-patches
  move-passengers
  update-offender-connections
  update-passenger-connections
  exert-influence
  enforce-barrier
  setup-colors
  tick
end
;; move passengers depending on intenal and external factors
to move-passengers
  let below-rating ((count passengers with [ycor < 0]) / num-passengers * 7)
  ask passengers [
    ifelse (alarm-level < alarm-creation)
      [
        ifelse (follow-affinity * norm-weight < below-rating)
        [
          ;; calm passengers travel towards the bottom
          ifelse (ycor >= 0.9)
            [facexy 0 0.8]
            [facexy 0 min-pycor]
        ]
        [
          ;; not alerted, but leaving because everyone else is
          ifelse (ycor <= -0.9)
            [facexy 0 -0.8]
            [set heading 0]
        ]
        if (can-move? (ambling-force / 100)) [forward (ambling-force / 100)]
      ]
      [
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        ;; alarmed passengers travel towards the gap then fan out
        ifelse (ycor <= -0.9)
          [facexy 0 -0.8]
          [
            set heading 0
          ]
        if (can-move? (fleeing-force / 100)) [forward (fleeing-force / 100)]
      ]
  ]
end
;; kill offender links that are too long and create new ones
to update-offender-connections
    ask offender-links [
      let kill? false
      let weighted-enmity (([physical-enmity] of end2) * physical-weight)
      ifelse (link-length >= weighted-enmity)
        ;; kill links that are too long
        [set kill? true]
        ;; kill links that intersect barriers
        [set kill? (not (has-line-of-sight? end1 end2))]
      if kill? [die]
    ]
    setup-offender-links
end
;; build a network around the offenders
to setup-offender-links
  ask offenders [
    create-offender-links-to (passengers with
      [((distance myself) < (physical-enmity * physical-weight))
        and (has-line-of-sight? self myself)]) [
      set color ([color] of end2)
    ]
  ]
end
;; kill passenger links that are too long and create new ones
to update-passenger-connections
  ask passenger-links [
    let kill? false
    let weighted-enmity (([physical-enmity] of end1) * physical-weight)
    ifelse (link-length >= weighted-enmity)
      ;; kill links that are too long    
      [set kill? true]
      ;; kill links that intersect barriers
      [set kill? (not (has-line-of-sight? end1 end2))]
    if kill? [die]
  ]
  setup-passenger-links
end
;; use links to spread information and move passengers
to exert-influence
  ask passengers [
    ;; offenders create alarm in passengers
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    ifelse (any? my-in-offender-links)
      [
        if (alarm-level < (alarm-creation * attitude-weight)) [
          set alarm-level (alarm-creation * attitude-weight)
        ]
      ]
      [
        ;; spread alarm to linked passengers
        if (any? out-passenger-link-neighbors) [
          let perceived-alarm (mean
            ([alarm-level] of out-passenger-link-neighbors))
          let shift ((perceived-alarm - alarm-level)
            * alarm-acquisition * mental-weight)
          set alarm-level (alarm-level + shift / 7)
        ]
      ]
    ;; enforce boundaries on alarm-levels
    if (alarm-level > 7) [set alarm-level 7]
    if (alarm-level < 0.01) [set alarm-level 0]
    ;; offender-passenger repulsion
    layout-spring
      (turtle-set self)                    ;; the set of turtles
      my-in-offender-links                 ;; the set of links
      0.1                                  ;; force exerted by link
      (physical-enmity * physical-weight)  ;; link target length
      0                                    ;; global turtle repulsion
    ;; exert passenger-passenger influence
    layout-spring
      (turtle-set self out-passenger-link-neighbors)
      my-out-passenger-links
      0.1
      (physical-enmity * physical-weight)
      0
  ]
end
;; move any passengers within the barrier onto the correct side
to enforce-barrier
  ask turtles [
    if (ycor < 1) and (ycor > -1) [
      ifelse (pxcor >= gap-size / -2) and (pxcor < gap-size / 2)
        [
          ;; turtles within gap are adjusted left or right
          if (pycor = 0) [
            if (xcor < (ceiling (gap-size / -2)))
            or (xcor > (floor (gap-size / 2))) [
              set xcor pxcor
            ]
          ]
        ]
        ;; turtles within barrier are adjusted up or down
        [
          ifelse (ycor >= 0)
            [set ycor 1]  ;; top half
            [set ycor -1] ;; bottom half of the barrier
        ]
    ]
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  ]
end
;; color turtles and links
to setup-colors
  ;; color turtles according to their alarm-level
  ask passengers [
    set color (scale-color red alarm-level 9 0)
  ]
  ask offender-links [
    set color ([color] of end2)
  ]
  ask passenger-links [
    set color ([color] of end2)
  ]
end
;; advance the simulation indefinitely
to go
  ifelse ((count (passengers with [ycor < 0])) > 5)
    [step]
    [stop]
end
;; remove existing offenders and spawn new ones
to spawn-offenders
  ask offenders [die]
  set-default-shape offenders "target"
  create-offenders num-offenders [
    set color red
    set xcor random-xcor
    set ycor (random-float (min-pycor + 1)) - 1
    correct-position
  ]
end
;; use mouse input to create an offender
to process-mouse
  ask offenders [die]
  set-default-shape offenders "target"
  create-offenders 1 [
    set color red
    set xcor mouse-xcor
    set ycor mouse-ycor
  ]
end
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APPENDIX D
THE CLASSROOM SOURCE CODE
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;; File: The Classroom.nlogo
;; Author: Marcel Bouchard
;; Date: 19 July 2011
;;
;; The purpose of this model is to incorporate behavioral intention
;; concepts into a classroom seating simulation, stressing social norm
;; components
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;; turtle breed: the desk
breed [desks desk]
;; turtle breed: the students
breed [students student]
students-own [
  prefer-front         ;; preference to sit near front
  prefer-alone         ;; preference towards desks with empty neighbors
  norm-front-adherence ;; strength of adherence to norm of 
                       ;; "sit near front"
  norm-same-adherence  ;; strength of adherence to norm of
                       ;; "sit in same seat"
  previous-desk        ;; number of desk from previous turn
]
;; prepare the simulation
to setup
  clear-all
  setup-patches
  setup-students
  setup-desks
  ask links [
    if (hide-connections?) [hide-link]
  ]
  display-labels
end
;; set patches to their default state
to setup-patches
  ask patches [set pcolor (yellow + 4)]
end
;; create students along the bottom of the room
to setup-students
  set-default-shape students "person"
  create-students num-students [
    set prefer-front (random-normal-1-7 4 1)
    set prefer-alone (random-normal-1-7 4 1)
    set norm-front-adherence (random-normal-1-7 4 1)
    set norm-same-adherence (random-normal-1-7 4 1)
    set previous-desk -1
    set xcor random-xcor
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  ]
end
;; produce a random number from 1 to 7 using a normal distribution
;; arg1 is the mean, arg2 the standard deviation
to-report random-normal-1-7 [arg1 arg2]
  let number (random-normal arg1 arg2)
  if (number < 1) [set number 1]
  if (number > 7) [set number 7]
  report number
end
;; create and arrange desks
to setup-desks
  set-default-shape desks "square"
  create-desks (num-rows * num-columns) [
    setxy max-pxcor max-pycor
    set heading 0
  ]
  ask desks [
    set color (brown - 2)
  ]
  arrange-desks
  network-desks
end
;; arrange desks into a grid formation
;; note: code inspired by Uri Wilensky's "Party" model
;;       as included with NetLogo
to arrange-desks
  ;; determine the interval between rows and columns
  let row-interval (floor ((world-width * 0.75) / num-rows))
  let column-interval (floor (world-width / num-columns))
  ;; store patches that serve as points on the grid
  let grid patches with [
    ;; space rows and columns evenly
    ((pycor mod row-interval) = 0) and
    ((pxcor mod column-interval) = 0) and
    ;; only add patches under the limit
    (floor (pycor / row-interval) < num-rows) and
    (floor (pxcor / column-interval) < num-columns)
  ]
  ;; determine the shift necessary to center rows and columns
  let y-shift (floor ((max-pycor - ([pycor] of (max-one-of grid [pycor])))
      / 2))
  let x-shift (floor ((max-pxcor - ([pxcor] of (max-one-of grid [pxcor])))
      / 2))
  ;; place desks onto unique grid locations
  ask desks [
    move-to (one-of (grid with [not (any? (other desks-here))]))
  ]
  ;; shift desks to center
  ask desks [
    set xcor (pxcor + x-shift)
    set ycor (pycor + y-shift)
  ]
end
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;; link adjacent desks together
to network-desks
  ask desks [
    ;; link with nearest column neighbors
    let same-column ((other desks) with [xcor = ([xcor] of myself)])
    create-links-with (same-column with-min [distance myself]) [
      set color black
    ]
    ;; link with nearest row neighbors
    let same-row ((other desks) with [ycor = ([ycor] of myself)])
    create-links-with (same-row with-min [distance myself]) [
      set color black
    ]
    ;; link with nearest neighbors not in same row or column
    let diagonals ((other desks) with [
      (xcor != ([xcor] of myself)) and
      (ycor != ([ycor] of myself))
    ])
    create-links-with (diagonals with-min [distance myself]) [
      set color black
    ]
  ]
end
;; draw indicator labels
to display-labels
  ask turtles [set label ""]
  ask patches [set plabel ""]
  if labels? [
    ask students [
      if (patch-at 1 1 != nobody) [
        ask patch-at 1 1 [
          set plabel ([who] of myself)
          set plabel-color lime
        ]
      ]
    ]
  ]
end
;; advance the simulation by one tick
to step
  ask links [
    ifelse (hide-connections?)
      [hide-link]
      [show-link]
  ]
  ifelse (any? students with [ycor = 0])
    [
      ask one-of students with [ycor = 0] [
        choose-desk
      ]
      display-labels
      tick
    ]
    [
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      stop
    ]
end
;; move all students to the front of the classroom
to reset-students
  setup-patches
  ask students [
    setxy random-xcor min-pycor
  ]
  display-labels
end
;; sit at an unoccupied desk
to choose-desk
  ;; convert student norm adherence into weights between 0 and 1
  let weight1 ((norm-front-adherence - 1) / 6)
  let weight2 ((norm-same-adherence - 1) / 6)
  ;; isolate the set of empty desks
  let available-desks (desks with [not (any? students-here)])
  ifelse (random 100) < (norm-sit-front * weight1)
    [
      ;; follow the norm of sitting in the front
      move-to (min-one-of available-desks [distancexy (max-pxcor / 2) 0])
      ask patch-here [set pcolor red]
      ask neighbors [set pcolor red]
    ]
    [
      ifelse (previous-desk >= 0) and
      (member? (desk previous-desk) available-desks) and
      (random 100) < (norm-sit-same * weight2)
        [
          ;; follow the norm of sitting in previous seat
          move-to (desk previous-desk)
          ask patch-here [set pcolor magenta]
          ask neighbors [set pcolor magenta]
        ]
        [
          ;; isolate the most preferred desk of those available,
          ;; disregarding norms
          let pick (find-best-desk self available-desks)
          move-to pick
          set previous-desk ([who] of pick)
          ask patch-here [set pcolor blue]
          ask neighbors [set pcolor blue]
        ]
    ]
end
;; given a student and desk set, report the most preferred desk
to-report find-best-desk [arg-student arg-desks]
  ;; find desks closest and furthest to front and center
  let closest-desk (min-one-of desks [distancexy (max-pxcor / 2) 0])
  let furthest-desk (max-one-of desks [distancexy (max-pxcor / 2) 0])
  ;; define region as the distance between the above two desks
  let distance-region -1
  ask closest-desk [
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    set distance-region (distance furthest-desk)
  ]
  ;; transform prefer-front [1 7] into a
  ;; preferred distance [0 distance-region]
  let ratio (abs (([prefer-front] of arg-student) - 7) / 6)
  let preferred-distance (ratio * distance-region)
  ;; find candidate desks that are close to this preferred distance
  let candidates -1
  ifelse ((count arg-desks) < 3)
    [
      set candidates arg-desks
    ]
    [
      set candidates (min-n-of 3 arg-desks [
        abs ((distance closest-desk) - preferred-distance)
      ])
    ]
  ;; report the candidate desk with the most compatible level of crowding
  let preferred-crowding ((abs (([prefer-alone] of arg-student)
        - 7) / 6) * 8)
  report (min-one-of candidates [abs (preferred-crowding
        - find-num-student-neighbors)])
end
;; report the number of neighbor desks with seated students
to-report find-num-student-neighbors
  report (count (link-neighbors with [any? (students-here)]))
end
;; advance the simulation indefinitely
to go
  step
end
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